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PreFACe: The sTory so FAr… 
AT A TIME OF HIGH DRAMA in the science and the 
politics of climate change, the first Hartwell Paper 
was published in May 2010 and quickly became well 
known for the novelty of its approach to climate 
policy.1 Distancing itself from the narratives and policy 
approaches that had so spectacularly collapsed at the 15th 
Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Copenhagen in December 2009, that group of Hartwell 
authors built upon 25 years of research and publication 
to advocate a different approach. This route was intended 
to avoid the pitfalls into which recent policies had led; 
and to promote in their place the radical pragmatism 
that has been a hallmark of the Hartwellian approach.2
The authors eagerly asserted that proactive action was 
required to reduce rapidly the weight of humanity’s 
footprint on our planet; but the paper also emphasised 
that wide and sustained public support was needed 
for any action to be effective over the long term. The 
argument began from the premise, later confirmed by 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) in April 2013, 
that the “top-down” policy of targets and timetables, 
embodied in UNFCCC-style climate change policy, had 
not made significant material change in the carbon 
intensity (CO2 per unit of GDP) of human civilization.3 
The authors also took the view that rather than being 
merely expedient, public policy to support and defend 
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human dignity should be integral to the enterprise. The 
second Hartwell paper, Climate Pragmatism, carried 
these same themes to an American readership in 2011. 
Building on these principles, four main arguments were 
popularised. The first concerned the mismatch between 
the character of the problem that is posed by climate 
change and the remedies advocated within the traditional 
UNFCCC-style “top-down” policy approach.
Climate change is an issue of such complex uncertainty, 
driven by so many ill-understood feedbacks, that it 
is – in the terms made famous by Rittel & Webber – a 
“wicked problem”.4 The special meaning of “wicked 
problems” as they defined it is characteristic of systems 
that are open, complex, and imperfectly understood. 
Although “wicked problems” are often formulated as 
though they are soluble, it is more accurate to regard 
them as persistent systemic conditions that can only 
be managed more or less successfully. As a result, the 
solutions that we adopt for “wicked” problems will be 
imperfect; they may be clumsy. It follows that the politics 
through which we approach “wicked” problems must 
be humble, avoiding that brittle, aggressive certainty 
that is so often a mark of modern democratic politics.
In its treatment of the “wicked” problem of climate 
change, the 2010 Hartwell Paper acknowledged the 
fact of the “climate wars” then raging (and that are 
still, to a lesser degree, continuing). However, the 
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authors declined to engage in them. This 2013 paper 
maintains that position, because the core themes and 
priorities of the approach it proposes do not depend upon 
taking a position in this battle. To be clear, all the major 
temperature ensembles agree that the century trend since 
the late 19th century shows that the atmosphere has 
warmed by approximately 0.8 degrees Centigrade. The 
precise balance of the forces responsible is still unclear, 
but it would be surprising if anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases, (the action of which has been plain 
since Arrhenius published his seminal work in 1896), 
have not contributed to a material degree, even if we now 
see that the effect cannot be specified as definitively as 
some would argue.5 Indeed, the welcome intensification 
of primary research since the 1980s in all branches of 
observation of the climate, in paleoclimatology and in 
data-processing and interpretation, has served to erode 
our confidence in the certainties of the 1980s-2000s, just 
as it has deepened our understanding. In spite of this 
uncertainty, it is still prudent to conclude that emissions 
of greenhouse gases should be rapidly reduced; but 
the aim of avoiding probable further anthropogenic 
temperature forcing becomes one reason among many. 
This modest and pluralistic approach has important 
consequences for the design of policy.
Unfortunately, combatants on both sides of the “climate 
wars” have tended to use arguments that focus upon 
short-term climate trends, observed over periods of time 
such as decades. These are too short to be informative, 
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whatever their rhetorical power. As a result, the watching 
public has become confused. On the one hand, the 
above average warming trend of the 1980s and 1990s 
sustained a catastrophist attitude amongst “climate 
action” advocates; on the other, the temperature plateau 
of the past fifteen years has deepened the suspicions 
of those who allege that the entire case for human 
involvement in global warming is a specious fabrication. 
Neither position is robust, and neither can provide a 
helpful conceptual framing if we wish, as the Hartwell 
authors do, to advance a pragmatic approach to what 
all informed parties grant is a problem simultaneously 
marked by grave hazards and great scientific lacunae.
In this perplexing situation we must, at the outset, 
acknowledge the specific difficulties posed by imperfectly 
understood open climate systems. Foremost among these 
is the fact that we can never know enough to conclude 
that research and data gathering should cease and 
policy-making begin. The two activities must proceed 
together, with policy remaining as responsive as possible 
to the changing state of understanding. Furthermore, 
we should acknowledge that “wicked” problems such 
as climate change present extreme difficulties for those 
whose hands rest upon the levers of governmental power. 
The desire to do something with their power is present 
in most politicians, and the pressure to act is sometimes 
overwhelming during periods when existential anxieties 
dominate the public mood; but prematurely irreversible 
actions, immune to course correction and improvement 
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and without the ability to identify and to open gateways 
to the possibility of radical invention, could be severely 
counter-productive.
Common sense can be quite misleading. One example, 
highlighted in the 2010 Hartwell Paper, was of the perverse 
effects of the Jevons Paradox (known academically as the 
“rebound effect”), which states that the energy savings 
that accrue from improvements in the efficiency of a 
process or a device do not translate symmetrically into 
reductions in the usage of energy.6 On the contrary, that 
process may become even more attractive and widely 
used. Alternatively, the purchasing power released by 
savings in energy expenditure is likely to be used to 
consume goods and services that themselves require 
energy, and thus to erode the energy savings from 
efficiency measures. As Jevons argued in his famous 
1866 study of the consequences of James Watts’ dramatic 
improvements in the efficiency of steam engines, such 
rebound effects might even result in a net increase in 
energy consumption.7 As the 2010 Paper documented, 
only in certain circumstances, for example in Japanese 
heavy industry, is there concrete historical evidence 
of improved energy efficiency translating directly into 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions.
To be sure, measures to improve energy efficiency are 
worth pursuing, and should indeed be encouraged: 
they make good economic sense globally, and in 
the developing world they contribute to sustainable 
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development by freeing up energy and wealth for other 
uses. Yet many climate policy makers have been quick 
to bank hypothetical reductions in energy use and 
emissions through efficiency gains without reflecting 
on their likelihood in a particular situation or economy. 
Doubts on this point are increasingly being voiced, 
though they are not yet universal.8
A different sort of unwelcome surprise was seen in the 
real world results of attempts to shift consumer behaviour 
by macroeconomic interventions. The self-declared 
flagship policy of this sort was the European Union’s 
attempt to create a market in carbon by legislative fiat. 
After a stormy voyage since its launch in 2005, the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was finally holed 
below the water line in April 2013, having failed for several 
years to sustain a carbon price sufficiently stable to 
stimulate the desired level of private investment in low-
carbon innovation, while continuing to threaten such 
high costs to industries that there was successful lobbying 
to undermine the scheme.9 Perhaps most importantly, 
the ETS was not permitted to operate freely, to encourage 
the economy to find least cost emissions reductions. 
Instead many other market interventions mandated the 
adoption of renewable technologies, each with their own 
implicit and usually higher cost of carbon reduction. 
In light of the complexity of the climate change issue, and 
evidence that attempts to produce conclusive “solutions” 
to such problems can cause unexpected and unwelcome 
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consequences, the Hartwell authors promoted a second 
theme. This suggested that a modern climate pragmatism 
could take its cue from “Capability” Brown’s principle of 
18th-century landscape garden design: “lose the object 
and approach obliquely.” The paper developed this insight 
to suggest that direct confrontation with the “wicked” 
problem of climate change was mistaken, and that an 
indirect approach was essential for success. The Hartwell 
method consequently embraced a range of topics aside 
from that of carbon-dioxide mitigation, all of which could 
lead obliquely and swiftly to beneficial outcomes.10
A third theme ran through the 2010 paper: Pielke’s 
Iron Law of Climate Politics.11 Named for one of the 
co-authors, who first spelled it out, the law holds that 
political economy constraints always put a limit on the 
“felt cost” and on the “willingness to pay” by current 
citizens and that policies that violate those constraints 
will not attain the legitimate authority to succeed, 
especially over the long time scales necessary to manage 
the wicked problem of climate change.
No climate policy which increases the felt cost of living for 
voters in democracies will attain legitimate authority and 
succeed. The proposition had fundamental implications 
for that suite of Kyoto Protocol era efforts to hasten 
adoption of low-carbon energy either through subsidies 
or by substantially increasing the cost of fossil fuels, 
both of which result in higher prices to consumers. As 
predicted by the Iron Law, these have not only proven to 
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be unpopular, but have helped to fuel a counter-narrative 
to that of the “catastrophic imperative” in climate policy.
The first Hartwell Paper offered a legitimation for action 
on climate that appealed neither to existential fear nor to 
a critique of markets. Its fourth argument, conforming to 
the Iron Law, was opposed to growth restricting policies 
that would offer little hope to the more than 1 billion 
people currently without access to electricity. That was 
considered to be both immoral and impractical, since 
it was bad politics. The approach spelled out in The 
Hartwell Paper, and elaborated in THE VITAL SPARK, 
places social justice and the enhancement of human 
dignity at its core. In pursuit of that goal, we seek to 
marshal a coalition for achievable actions to reduce 
poverty, especially in the demographic superpowers 
of India, China, Brazil, Indonesia, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with the contingent but equally valuable benefit 
of lightening the human footprint on the planet.
This agenda of radical pragmatism, as expressed in 
the 2010 paper, was taken up with some enthusiasm by 
several state parties outside the European Union, as well 
as by some major industrial enterprises. Since that time 
there have been moves in the framing of international 
diplomacy that are resonant with The Hartwell Paper’s 
insights. Notable is the growing emphasis on “bottom-
up”, national imperatives rather than international 
“top-down” points of departure.12 This welcome trend 
is explored further in section 4.
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The logic of the 2010 Hartwell paper pointed towards 
the need for both radical invention and incremental 
innovation in the generation of energy by lower-, low- 
and non-carbon means. There are encouraging signs 
that there is a growing understanding of this need. 
Only when power from non-carbon fuel sources is more 
affordable to the consumer than that from fossil fuels, 
without subsidy to either, will they prevail spontaneously 
in the world’s markets and produce lasting change in 
the global energy mix. At present the combined role of 
nuclear (4.9 per cent), hydro (6.5 per cent), and other 
renewables (1.6 per cent) is not large, and that of non-
hydro renewables – the focus of our attention in this 
paper – is especially small.13
The Vital Spark builds upon the track record of 
the earlier Hartwell papers. What now follows is an 
attempt to provide a comprehensive prospectus for 
constructive suggestions on how policy consistent with 
these principles can foster invention and accelerate 
subsequent innovation in the energy sector.
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suMMAry
•	  The Vital Spark is an attempt to learn salutary and 
positive lessons from the unusual decade 2003-13.  
one major conclusion defines the topic of 
this third hartwell paper: top-down policies 
directed at climate mitigation have thus far 
failed to achieve their objectives, and it seems 
likely that they never will. Only a spontaneous 
and fundamentally affordable and politically 
sustainable energy transition can succeed. This 
requires both invention (discovery) and innovation 
(application of discoveries), with the recognition 
that policy agendas based on the deployment 
of existing technologies may be constraining, 
particularly with regard to invention.
•	  The co-authors therefore propose a range of 
pragmatic Building Block concepts, eleven in 
all, that should underpin attempts to provide all 
of humanity with access to energy that is both 
affordable and has decreasing carbon intensity  
and polluting consequences.
•	  Only a high-energy planet is morally defensible 
or politically viable (i). As Hartwellians argued 
in 2010 and still maintain, it is not acceptable to 
pursue policies that will leave the bottom billion  
of humanity without the energy services they 
require for wellbeing and dignity. 
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•	  However, at present, only carbon-intensive sources of 
energy offer a realistic prospect of such a high-energy 
world, with (ii) obvious hazards to the climate.
•	  It notes that (iii) the discovery and exploitation of 
new fossil fuels appear to outpace the discovery 
and exploitation of low-carbon energy sources now 
and for the near future; and that (iv) current low-
carbon energy technologies are technically and 
economically uncompetitive.
•	  Therefore (v) pragmatic and (vi) open-minded and 
pluralistic innovation policies are essential, with 
the recognition that (vii) policy failures must be 
embraced as the necessary price of progess.
•	  Employing the definitions set down at the outset, 
the case is made that (viii) both radical invention 
and innovation are required, and that (ix) the 
deployment of nascent and maturing or entirely 
novel technologies alike should be undertaken as 
a means leading to the growth of knowledge and 
further invention: not an end in itself.
•	  Amplifying the theme of necessary pluralism, 
there (x) must be recognition that energy 
innovation must proceed by more than one 
pathway at once.
•	  The final Building Block links back to the first: 
it argues that (xi) broad, bottom-up social 
legitimation of policies is morally and practically 
indispensable.
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•	  The paper then reviews the lessons of the decade 
2003-13 by examining recent experiences with 
energy innovation in energy transitions. It explains 
that, historically, policy “driven” energy transitions 
are rare; but that the outcomes of different policy 
instruments and processes, especially in Europe 
and the USA from 2003-13, are valuable as a source 
of information and positive lessons.
•	  With an eye on pragmatic and achieveable 
improvements, the paper then describes 
Hartwellian options for National Level Actions 
(NLAs). It advocates ways to stimulate energy 
innovation through more intelligent investment. 
It suggests how to overcome the limitations 
of institutions and make incentives work as 
they should. Then, inspired by the growing 
importance of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions (NAMAs), it advocates analogous 
and complementary “Nationally Appropriate 
Innovation Actions” (NAIAs). 
•	  NAMAs and NAIAs can stimulate new processes 
in diplomacy. Therefore the paper next spells 
out Hartwellian options for International Level 
Actions (ILAs). It explains how
–   to understand and implement the positive 
lessons from the failure of the Kyoto regime;
–   to recognise and accommodate the interests of 
different parties in a transfer of new technology;
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–   to embrace the results of an already naturally 
occurring global division of labour in energy 
innovation.
•	  Politicians frequently call for “ambitious” solutions 
– meaning extreme or difficult solutions – in the 
fields of climate policy and of energy innovation. 
The paper explains that this is misleading 
interpretation of the term ambition, the Latin root 
of which, ambire, reminds us that the exploration 
of possibilities and securing of public support 
are crucial. Only this grounded interpretation of 
ambition will result in real, concrete results. More 
lurid pretences of “ambition” that lack any concept 
to deliver on their bold pronouncements do little 
good to anyone, save perhaps the ephemeral 
interests of the politicians who mouth them.
•	  The paper ends with the co-authors’ view of what 
an Hartwellian ambition for the future really 
is, which has been the underlying purpose of 
the entire work: only general prosperity can 
produce widespread consent for emissions 
reductions, and only affordable energy can 
deliver prosperity for all.
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InTroDuCTIon: DeFInITIons, 
MoTIvATIons AnD ACKnowLeDGMenTs
This paper seeks to exploit the insights of the first 
Hartwell Paper of 2010 by applying its principles to the 
field of invention and innovation in the energy sector, 
which the authors judge to be an area as neglected as 
it is essential for human welfare and for the welfare of 
the planet.
Invention and innovation are not the same; but they 
work hand in hand. Although used interchangeably 
in colloquial speech, and inevitably related, there are 
distinctions between these two concepts that, at the 
outset, we must specify and defend lest imprecision 
lead to confusion. Etymology, as ever, provides a guide.
Invention, from its Latin root invenire, means to come 
upon, to find. The term suggests fundamental thought 
that makes new discoveries. It is dominant in the realm 
of the pure sciences, where there is more scope for 
dramatic discovery which can change everything in a 
flash – or in a “Big Bang”.
Innovation (innovare), on the other hand, is concerned 
with the reform or the alteration of something already 
existing, or the introduction of something new to an 
existing situation. Importantly, innovation enjoys an 
asymmetrical relationship with its close relative. Some 
inventions will never lead to innovation. Invention initiates. 
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Further invention may take place during innovation, and 
sometimes incremental tinkering can find the gateway to 
more fundamental invention; but it is more likely to be 
constrained by the scope of the innovatory project. Thus 
constrained, it is more directed towards writing variations 
than composing new themes. This places important limits 
on “learning by doing”: limits that are too often neglected 
in current policy.
Most crucially for our present purposes, under certain 
conditions innovation may bring no new invention at all, 
but simply deploy existing inventions without any further 
intellectual progress. In Joseph Schumpeter’s memorable 
phrase, while you may “add successively as many mail-
coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby”.14 
We believe that this has been the outcome of many current 
low-carbon energy policies, which are, in effect, only 
deployment for deployment’s sake, regardless of whether 
this is innovatory in itself, or encourages innovation and 
further invention. This would not matter if the current 
state of intellectual knowledge in energy engineering 
were adequate to provide spontaneously competitive 
low-carbon energy. Sadly, it is not.
Consequently, this paper argues that policies should 
be reoriented, not only to ensure that there is adequate 
support for invention, but also that where innovation 
is supported – as it should be – it does not degenerate 
into a process of sterile deployment, but is productive of 
further invention. Therefore, in sum, creative innovation 
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is mainly innovare, but with elements of invenire, in ways 
that we shall explore. And as a product of human choice 
in an arena wider than that of technology alone, energy 
innovation is inevitably an intensely social activity. As we 
shall see, when this is forgotten, things quickly fall apart.
This Hartwell paper does not describe “how to do energy 
innovation successfully”, because no-one can give such a 
prescription to fit all circumstances. If they do, distrust 
them. There is no magic formula. Having already, in 
the Preface, reminded readers of the initial Hartwellian 
insights, and how the 2010 Hartwell paper came to 
conclude that innovation was our next area of work, 
what we do here is to describe the necessary conditions 
for success in energy innovation.
First, we lay out eleven Building Blocks that we believe 
should frame any successful policy for energy innovation. 
Then we review recent experience. We look for concrete 
success. We find that there is some, but not nearly 
enough. So we employ the Seventh Building Block, and 
we report positive lessons from recent failures. 
Thus armed, we then return to the fora of politics and 
describe the requirements for first national and then 
international policy that arise from the largely cautionary 
lessons that we have learned.
We have been able to do this work with renewed, 
enlarged and indispensable funding from the Nathan 
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Cummings Foundation, to which all the authors 
gratefully acknowledge their debt. With this increased 
funding, a series of studies was commissioned. The 
enlarged Hartwell group convened for this phase of 
work then gathered in Vancouver, British Columbia 
in February 2013 to review the results and to design 
this paper.
It is being published in English in printed form and 
simultaneously in electronic form. Translations into 
numerous foreign languages are to follow; these will 
be freely available.
As Convenor and Co-ordinator of the group and as 
the principal writers integrating their contributions, 
we would like to thank all the co-authors for their 
diligence, and those other members of the Hartwell 
group who were not co-authors of this particular paper 
for their comments.
Gwythian Prins (Hartwell group convenor) 
Mark Eliot Caine (Hartwell group co-ordinator)
The Mackinder Programme 
London School of Economics & Political Science
June 2013
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 1   
The eLeven buILDInG bLoCK 
ConCePTs ThAT GuIDe The 
hArTweLLIAn APProACh To  
enerGy InnovATIon
This paper is about how circles may be squared. It is 
about how to achieve the simultaneous and apparently 
conflicting objectives of a high energy, low-carbon world. 
We seek the means of providing large quantities of energy 
at low cost, and with low environmental impact.
Any programme of work, or conceptual framing, rests 
upon a series of Building Block concepts. These may 
be convictions of principle or they may be conclusions 
reached after research. Often, such assumptions are not 
made explicit. They may even be deliberately hidden 
in order to evade criticism. This lack of exposure is 
dangerous in that it not only conceals intellectual 
weaknesses, but also forecloses legitimate debate over 
core values and principles. On the principle that sunlight 
is the best antiseptic, this paper attempts to make explicit 
the assumptions on which the authors agree and which 
therefore form a common foundation for their approach.
(i) only a high-energy planet is morally or 
politically acceptable
The need for energy with low environmental impact 
is, of course, widely acknowledged. But it is not being 
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delivered. As we highlighted in the 2010 Hartwell Paper, 
and as has been confirmed in international climate 
negotiations in the intervening years, a global climate 
strategy that does not alleviate inequality and sustain 
aspirations for development will – rightly in our view – 
not be acceptable to the governments or populations of 
large developing countries. We therefore view the lack 
of universal access to a quantity and quality of energy 
sufficient for human dignity and empowerment as a 
policy failure, an unacceptable moral outcome and an 
impediment to political progress.
Most of the people alive today who are left without 
electricity live in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
are among the poorest in the world. The role of stable, 
safe, and affordable energy in bringing economic growth 
and development to such populations is well known and 
well documented; and there is no doubt that access to 
electricity is a prerequisite for economic and political 
empowerment. For this reason, and understandably, 
energy access has been and remains a leading political 
objective in the demographic superpowers of Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, trumping the climate change 
agenda. But must this be so?
The Hartwellian approach believes that it is no paradox 
to suggest that we can attain the objective of energy 
with low environmental impact only if we also create a 
high energy global economy with reliable energy that all 
can afford to buy. The case for universal energy access 
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is not just a moral one; it is also a matter of political 
legitimation and pragmatism.
How can we achieve this? Hitherto, the issue has been 
framed – in the combative context of international 
climate diplomacy – as a contest between sharply different 
objectives: the interests of human development and those 
of the natural environment. Prominent Non Governmental 
Organisations have entered the lists on behalf of their 
declared special interests, to joust as champions for their 
conflicting causes. We must find a way to balance the 
values and interests of all, or be condemned to failure. 
We have reviewed the sadly unproductive present state 
of affairs and think that to do better, we need to return 
to first principles. 
(ii) It will be hazardous to build a high-energy 
planet with current carbon-intensive sources
There are a number of reasons why building a high-energy 
planet with current carbon-intensive energy sources would 
be hazardous. They range from conventional national 
security concerns to health and emissions impacts. 
The latest BP Statistical Review calculates that 87 per 
cent of global primary energy supply comes from coal, 
oil, or natural gas: 30 per cent, 33 per cent, and 24 per 
cent respectively.15 Using such an energy mix to provide 
universal access to sufficient energy for all – and to meet the 
greatly increased future energy demand assumed across 
virtually all well-researched predictions of energy demand 
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– would likely produce atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide at least double and possibly triple that 
of the 280 ppm of the pre-industrial era. If we add to 
this the increases in energy access that we believe to be 
necessary (and which are not currently included in the 
scenarios published by international energy agencies 
and large energy companies), the problem becomes still 
more acute. Smog and lung illnesses in China and India 
remind us that a coal-fuelled high-energy world carries 
severe risk to human health as well as to the health of 
the ecosphere. 
We have no infallible way to assess precisely the climatic 
impact of such an increase in emissions. The outputs of 
computer models are subject to the obvious cautions that 
results are dependent upon the input assumptions, and that 
those results are projections: not predictions. Still, we can 
take as at least indicative the computer modelling endorsed 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
that a doubling or more from pre-industrial levels of carbon 
dioxide (280 ppm) of atmospheric carbon dioxide might 
produce a global average temperature increase on the 
order of 2 degrees Celsius, and possibly a temperature 
increase of 4 degrees or beyond.16 It is an hypothesis not 
to be taken lightly.
Therefore, rising energy demands and the needs of the 
energy poor must somehow be satisfied from an energy 
mix that is progressively lower in carbon intensity (CO2 
per unit of GDP), with the aim of becoming zero carbon 
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or even carbon negative. But this is not straightforward. 
The premium global energy fuel – oil – has the manifest 
attractions of high energy density, precision of content, 
portability, temperature range tolerance, relative ease of 
storage, and versatility of fractions from naphtha to jet 
fuel. For these reasons, it has become the indispensable 
reference fuel of our age. It will require a remarkable 
breakthrough – or many – to replicate these qualities in 
a lower and ultimately low and zero carbon energy mix 
capable of being scaled to meet global demand, and to 
do so at prices that the least wealthy consumers, who are 
also those currently without access to modern energy 
services, can afford to pay.
Is this an unattainable goal? After study in a wide range 
of contributing disciplines, the co-authors of this 
paper have come to the view that while it will certainly 
be a remarkable achievement, it is not, a priori, an 
impossibility. But, as explained below, the problem is not 
so much the (considerable) technological difficulties, but 
rather the need for a different sort of energy innovation: 
one which will address the problem in a way that enables 
us to satisfy the triple requirements listed above; namely 
for energy that is plentiful, affordable, and of low 
environmental impact.
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(iii) The discovery and exploitation of new 
fossil energy sources outpace the discovery and 
exploitation of low-carbon energy sources now 
and for the near future.
A reality check is always useful. The challenge to shift the 
global energy system to be lower-, low-, and ultimately 
zero- or negative-carbon has always been daunting. In 2011, 
fossil fuels, nuclear power, and hydroelectricity provided 
98.4 per cent of global primary energy as opposed to 
“new renewables” upon which so much has been bet; and 
fossil fuels enjoy tremendous benefits by virtue of their 
incumbency. Most global infrastructure is built to support 
a fossil-derived energy supply, and the fossil fuel economy 
shapes and enriches some of the world’s most powerful 
companies and financial institutions. In some cases it 
pre-occupies the fortunes of national governments, too, 
which is a mixed blessing. All these companies, banks, 
and oil-producing states – and their shareholders and 
citizens respectively – have strong incentives to maintain 
a fossil-intensive global energy mix, or indeed to expand 
the use of fossil fuels globally. As we have seen, these baser 
motives do not operate in a vacuum. Consumers and 
investors have strong and valid reasons to be attracted 
to the benefits of fossil fuels.
Renewable energy policies, even when fuelled by political 
drive, have so far failed to carve out a substantial market 
share for renewable technologies. Simultaneously, over 
the past decade, the successful deployment of new 
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and improved extraction techniques for fossil fuels 
has changed the global energy landscape. Advances in 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing techniques 
allow petroleum producers to recover both oil and gas 
from previously inaccessible shale rock formations. The 
increase in proven oil and gas reserves in unconventional 
formations (“tight” rock or oil sands, for example) seem 
likely to compensate for the depletion of mature oil and 
gas fields in near-term decades. CCU (Carbon Capture 
and Use) will also help to purge previously exhausted 
oil fields, further boosting production. BP’s estimates 
of proven oil and natural gas reserves in 2011 are 30 per 
cent and 24 per cent above 2001 levels, respectively. The 
global R/P (reserves to production) ratio for oil (ie, years 
remaining at that year’s extraction rate) was 31 in 1981, 
42 in 1991 and is 54 in 2011.17 Or in different numbers, 
global oil reserves were 1,032.7 thousand million barrels 
in 1991 and 1,652.6 in 2011. The increase in proven gas 
reserves has been even more startling, from 131.2 trillion 
cubic metres in 1991 to 208.4 trillion cubic metres in 
2011.18 Oil boosters point to such figures and ask where 
the problem is. Hasn’t it gone away? No.
These updated reserve figures undermine the basic 
assumption of the well established “scarcity peak” 
school which, in popular presentation at least, holds 
that declining fossil fuel availability will soon force the 
adoption of renewable energy technologies, making 
clean energy both necessary and economic. The political 
utility of the “scarcity peak” fossil-fuel argument – which, 
THE VITAL SPARKTHE VITAL SPARK36 37
although often voiced in catastrophist language, can be 
seen to be no more than wishful thinking for now – is 
voided by a mismatch of scales. The undisputed fact 
is that world fossil fuel resources are, like the life of 
the planet, eventually finite. As John Maynard Keynes 
observed on a shorter time scale, “in the long run we are 
all dead”. Although the assumption is true in the long 
term, that does not translate into an assumption that 
reserves will fall any time soon, as the BP figures show; 
nor that prices will rise for reasons of simple scarcity. 
But we must note it because perceptions are powerful 
in the politics of climate change.
However, there is a different and more empirical “rate 
peak” school of thought, which dissociates itself from the 
“scarcity peak” argument.19 It correctly notes that “tight” 
oil and gas cost considerably more, per unit, to extract 
than “easy” oil and gas in mature fields, such as those in 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which means that while 
R/P ratios may be rising now, the extraction of these new 
supplies is at great and rising cost. So the argument goes 
that fossil-based energy production costs will certainly 
rise, although not for the primary reasons advanced by 
advocates of “scarcity peak”. Once the investment/return 
ratio closes too much, recovery becomes uneconomic, 
and, it is suggested, “rate peak” occurs.
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But will it? “Scarcity peak” ignores and “rate peak” 
underestimates the role of human ingenuity that can 
blossom under the right institutional conditions. The 
“shale revolution” that horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing have brought about is witness to that. Are we 
sure that there will be no more surprises of this kind? 
Rather than a diminishing supply of fossil fuels with 
rising prices, today’s expectation is that relatively low 
fossil-fuel prices (in real terms of use-value in economic 
activity) will remain the norm, at least over the medium-
term, and especially for natural gas and coal. Global 
coal use increased by 5.4 per cent in 2011 experiencing 
the greatest absolute increase in quantity of any fuel. 
Although it is not wise to extrapolate from a short-term 
trend, it is the case that the currently falling real cost 
of coal is in part a consequence of the displacement of 
coal by gas in the US energy mix. 
At the same time, mainly due to the successive shut-down of 
Japan’s nuclear power fleet after the Fukushima tsunami, by 
2012 low carbon nuclear use fell by 6.9 per cent – which was 
the largest annual fall on record. And those who place faith 
in swift substitution from “renewables” must remember that 
all together, excluding hydroelectricity, they represented 
a marginal 1.6 per cent of global energy use.
A transition to “renewable” energy predicated on scarce 
fossil fuels and rising prices is therefore not at all certain. 
Any efficient social impetus for energy innovation will 
plainly have a source other than the “peak” arguments.
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The only zero carbon source that can technically be scaled 
up in short order is nuclear – much faster than renewables 
on a similar time-frame; and while not the case in China 
and to a degree India, the trend in the West after the 
Fukushima incident is the opposite. One must remember 
that, at Fukushima, the nuclear fail-safe systems were 
largely effective: it was the inadequate protection of 
diesel fuel tanks for stand-by cooling generators that 
compounded the seriousness of the accident: a lay-out 
planning and low-technology fault. So what we must 
learn from the Fukushima incident is not only that we 
must make every effort to improve nuclear safety and 
the general all-system safety of nuclear plant sites – for 
there will be ever more nuclear power stations installed 
around the world – but that an accident can happen even 
in a country like Japan, with mature nuclear technology. 
After the accident, investigative committees identified 
the causes. Some were context-specific (mis-management 
in the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and 
other organisations, for example); but others had wider 
significance. Nuclear accidents could take place in China 
or India: we cannot deny that possibility. So the reasons 
why nuclear power is not likely ever to be the sole solution 
for a low carbon energy transition are that not only is 
there the risk of accident inherent in the technology 
ensemble (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima) 
but also because an outage like that which Japan has 
just experienced can have a great impact on the pattern 
of global energy supply, and the global economy, once 
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accidents like Fukushima take place. In Japan’s case the 
ensuing shut-down not only resulted in power shortages; 
it also “maxed out” the country’s LNG import terminals 
and hugely increased its coal imports. All these extra costs 
also decimated Japan’s historic balance of trade surpluses. 
(iv) Current low-carbon energy technologies are 
technically and economically uncompetitive
Transforming the world’s energy system is one of the 
principal political and technological challenges of the 
21st century. Perhaps it is the principal challenge. The 
low energy density of low-carbon fuels is the source of 
many of the technological difficulties in this proposed 
transition, meaning that low-carbon energy technologies 
must jump various hurdles before they are fit for diffusion 
at scale. The hurdles are numerous and significant: capital 
and operation and maintenance costs, integration costs 
arising from uncontrollable variability (intermittency) of 
popular wind and solar resources, and public acceptance, 
particularly of the oft-diffuse geographic impact of these 
low-density fuels. Each hurdle is high at present. The partial 
exception is biomass for electricity, a standard dispatchable 
technology, which is less discussed and more used today 
than is widely realised (half of all the “green” megawatt 
hours generated in the UK between 2002 and 2012 were 
from biomass related technologies). But the cultivation of 
fuel on the scale required poses environmental problems 
and land-use opportunity/cost conflicts (in particular with 
food production) that are equally limiting.
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In the electricity sector today, the direct costs of 
generating electricity from renewable technologies are 
typically greater than simply burning fossil fuels such as 
gas or coal by 50-300 per cent.20 Wind and solar power 
are still, in spite of some progress, comparatively capital 
intensive per unit of capacity (MW), and when this is 
combined with low load factors (around 10 per cent 
for solar, and around 25 per cent for wind in Europe), 
the costs per megawatt hour (MWh) generated are 
necessarily also high. Furthermore, the integration costs 
of uncontrollable generators are high. Large fleets of 
conventional generation must, currently, be retained 
to ensure security of supply when renewables are not 
available, on a cloudy, windless afternoon for example. 
Additional grid lines must be constructed to prevent 
congestion, and special rapid response plants must 
be constructed to correct errors in the wind and solar 
forecasts. Some studies conclude that these “integration” 
costs for even minority fractions of renewables are likely 
to be high – perhaps very high – and therefore to increase 
substantially the direct cost of energy derived from 
these sources.21
Nuclear power, which seems to be economically viable in 
China, where 29 units are presently being constructed, 
faces safety concerns associated with current light 
water designs and more general constraining factors, 
as discussed in the Japanese context, above. Current 
carbon capture technologies, though very interesting, 
are nowhere near viable today, and may add as much 
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as 50 per cent to the cost of coal or gas power. Finally, 
energy efficiency, while often touted as the most cost-
effective way to avoid carbon emissions, is unlikely to be 
a climate change panacea due to increased consumption 
in the developing world, not least for the reasons cited 
by Jevons’ and noted above.22 In fact, there is evidence to 
suggest that rates of energy efficiency are falling around 
the world due to more energy-intensive lifestyles and 
industrial production.23 Even the most aggressive energy 
efficiency-promoting jurisdictions such as California 
have managed to reduce electric demand by only about 
15 per cent from the baseline: a welcome improvement, 
but not a transformational one.24
As a result of these considerable hurdles, the cost of 
extracting and converting low density energy flows 
from organic cycles and delivering them to consumers 
has not fallen sufficiently to be remotely competitive for 
electricity generation with either coal or gas at current 
prices. The position in the transport sector is also – if 
not even more – bleak. The advantages as transport fuels 
of oil and, to a degree, LNG and CNG – for example in 
the Indian urban public transport fleet – (high energy 
density and hence miles per gallon, safely, portability, 
refuelling network availability etc) have not yet been 
challenged by false starts most especially with hydrogen 
and all-electric alternatives, as the very poor take-up of 
alternative powered vehicles shows (except as fashion 
or political statements in some wealthy constituencies).
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(v) relentless pragmatism, favouring simplicity, 
points to effective solutions
We may therefore see quite clearly that there is no 
convenient and powerful external argument that will 
propel the cause of an energy transition from high- to 
low-, zero- or negative-carbon sources. The transition 
will have to occur based on its own merits. Therefore, 
across all stages and scales of the innovation process, 
we have a bias for pragmatic solutions. The simplest 
solution is usually the best one. In practice, this means 
an approach that avoids heroic assumptions, identifies 
and amplifies what has been shown to work, and builds 
on and transfers best practices. 
The Kyoto process failed to provide the greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions that it promised because it was 
unwieldy, complicated, and costly. It was built upon 
unrealistic assumptions about what nations are willing to 
or can accomplish, and it invested unfounded confidence 
in binding international legal agreements. Consequently, 
complicated mechanisms designed to transfer the costs 
of mitigation from developing to industrialized nations 
have not delivered the scale of emissions reductions in 
developing countries envisaged by the architects of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The United States refused to participate in 
the treaty and China, India and other major emitters who 
accounted for the bulk of emissions growth, were exempt. 
All recognised, correctly, that it would have significantly 
impeded economic growth and they were not willing 
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to accept this trade-off. Furthermore, until recently the 
Kyoto process did not even identify – let alone provide 
support for – the technological means by which nations 
can achieve reductions of greenhouse gases.
Where countries have achieved significant emissions 
reductions, it is because they have followed practical 
solutions that do not infringe upon economic growth. 
In some cases they contribute substantially to it. In the 
United States, natural gas has been rapidly displacing 
coal-fired electricity, with supplementary contributions 
from modern renewables and improving efficiency of the 
U.S. automotive fleet. US energy-related CO2 emissions 
are at a 20-year low.25 Decarbonisation of the US electric 
power sector was made possible by the availability of 
low-cost, abundant natural gas and, to a much lesser 
extent, targeted deployment subsidies for renewable 
energy. In the late 1970s and 1980s France made a 
strategic decision to meet growing energy demand by 
expanding its nuclear power industry, supported by 
robust government subsidies. Between 1979 and 1989, 
French CO2 emissions declined by some 30 per cent 
and have remained at low levels since. But France is (as 
always) a special case.
(vi) open-minded and pluralistic policies only, 
please
In addition to being pragmatic and as simple as possible, 
policies must be technologically open-minded, with no a 
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priori exclusion or privileging of individual technologies 
(picking winners or stigmatising losers). Experience 
in other domains, for example the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) instigated by the 
US Department of Defense, has shown that a focus on 
outcomes and agnostic assumptions about paths towards 
these outcomes will be more effective than privileging 
specific technological routes. This is especially true 
where integration of multiple technologies is involved, 
as it encourages cross-disciplinary problem-solving and 
provides the impetus for creativity. Funding of such 
processes should be competitive, and funders should 
be prepared to support exploratory research before 
establishing priorities for substantive development. 
Furthermore, commercialisation and deployment supports 
for still-nascent and maturing technologies should remain 
innovation-centred and thus support only the level of 
deployment needed to ensure continued innovation 
and learning about the future potential of currently 
immature technologies and business models. Competition 
between still-improving technology approaches must be 
maintained and prematurely “picking winners” avoided. 
(vii) embracing failure is vital to achieving success
Innovation is messy. It is a dynamic, evolutionary process 
in which technologies fail or succeed according to their 
ability to thrive within prevailing market conditions, 
which themselves are shaped by policy and sometimes 
subject to frequent change. Contrary to conventional 
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wisdom, the frequent failure of innovators is not 
inherently a problem, even at a wide scale. What is a 
problem is when a culture of stigmatising failures – or 
those responsible for them – discourages calculated 
risk-taking and drives potential innovators away from 
pursuing their vision. Equally problematic is the 
situation that arises when, lacking effective processes 
and incentives to examine their own failures or those 
of others, innovators fail to learn lessons from failure 
and apply these lessons to further innovation activity.
What is essential therefore is for there to be a climate 
that makes it safe for inventors (and policy makers) to 
take risks and to fail: a climate in which failure is learned 
from, not stigmatised; in which would-be innovators 
who have failed are empowered to continue trying; and 
in which more people are encouraged to participate in 
innovation in the first place. We must increase calculated 
risk-taking by decreasing the financial and opportunity 
costs of failure. We must change our very perception of 
failure itself. Though easier said than done, changing 
perceptions towards failure and increasing calculated 
risk-taking by decreasing the financial and opportunity 
costs of failure, is essential.
(viii) we need invention and innovation, working 
together
As several of us argued in the 2010 Hartwell Paper, 
expanding access to modern energy while reducing 
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anthropogenic carbon emissions requires both 
rapid transfer of best available low-carbon energy 
technology to all and sustained improvement of low-
carbon technologies. But there are two routes to that 
destination. In this paper, we argue for a policy focus 
both on incremental innovation – the gradual expansion 
of our technological frontier through performance 
improvements and cost reductions – and on radical 
invention that can “disrupt” existing energy markets 
and accelerate energy system transition.
For the purposes of managing the dual challenge of 
emissions reduction and energy expansion, we group 
energy innovations into three classifications:
•	 Less carbon-intensive energy technology
•	 Zero-carbon energy technology
•	 Negative carbon technology.
The first and second of these exist already, and innovation 
in these categories can and should be both incremental 
and radical. Existing technology in these categories could 
also be deployed widely once economically viable. In 
the first instance, energy conservation technology and 
lower- and zero-carbon energy production methods 
could be transferred from advanced economies with 
low carbon intensities to large emerging economies 
with high carbon intensities (CO2/GDP). That India and 
China are, respectively, roughly four and five times more 
carbon intensive than the United States, and roughly 
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thirteen and eighteen times more carbon intensive than 
world leaders such as Sweden, suggests that there is 
considerable room for improvement across the board.
The third technological category, negative carbon 
technology, may turn out to be crucial in managing global 
environmental systems, particularly if we remain on or near 
our current emissions trajectories. In their current forms, 
unless nuclear energy is deployed at a scale not currently 
envisaged, low-carbon and zero-carbon technologies 
are not sufficient to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
absolute terms as populations grow, economic growth 
continues, and industrial demand increases. Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) and Carbon Capture and Use 
(CCU) technologies are the systems in question. CCU is 
more likely to be fruitful in the short term. Furthermore, 
some experiments are being conducted to invent a new 
chemical process of catalysis to turn CO2 directly into 
new materials, including food and fabrics. 
So far, efforts to move CCS technologies from the 
conceptual stage to demonstration and deployment 
have been only minimally successful, although some 
demonstration plants are running. CCU, however, has 
already been demonstrated, for example in the Canadian 
Athabasca oil sands. In Norway and the United States, 
CO2 is extracted from process combustion and is then 
used to purge conventional oil fields of residual reserves 
(a process called Enhanced Oil Recovery – EOR). CO2 
is also used in intensive horticulture to speed plant 
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growth, a process that, like EOR, places market value 
on CO2. But efforts to develop such technologies and 
applications have not proceeded nearly as quickly as 
virtually all international energy agencies and large 
energy companies have assumed in their climate 
mitigation scenarios (or argued is necessary for climate 
change mitigation).
(ix) Deployment of early-stage technologies 
should be as a means, not an end
The innovation cycle includes research, development, 
testing, demonstration, adoption, and diffusion. This 
process is non-linear and involves numerous critical 
feedbacks and linkages between problems and solutions 
identified and trailed at each stage. The need for public 
support at the basic research and development level – 
due to the significant differential between public and 
private returns to investment during this stage – is a 
well-understood economic principle. We argue that this 
public-private return differential is not limited simply 
to the basic research and development or “invention” 
phase of energy innovation. Yet public support for testing 
and demonstration is not always forthcoming, as sums 
of funding required at this stage grow, sometimes by 
an order of magnitude; and governments often fear to 
be seen to fail.
There are two main obstacles limiting the transition from 
basic R&D to diffusion that suggest a need for public 
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financing at intermediate stages of innovation. The first 
obstacle to be crossed is the so-called “technological 
valley of death”. It is encountered when the capital 
required to turn science into a potentially profitable 
product or to undertake pilot projects is not forthcoming 
due to a high risk of failure. The second obstacle is the 
difficulty of finding finance to support the demonstration 
of technologies at scale, sometimes referred to as the 
“commercialization valley of death”.26
The trap in which promising early-stage technologies 
lie stranded is particularly grim for energy technologies 
because they generally have high capital and 
infrastructure costs. Crossing such “valleys of death” 
cannot be accomplished in the absence of public 
support and policies that encourage later private sector 
investment; but this support must be tailored in such 
a way that it does not result in sterile deployment for 
deployment’s sake, terminating further incremental 
innovation or invention. This is a key characteristic of 
the Hartwellian approach.
(x) recognise that energy innovation must proceed 
by more than one pathway at once
Innovation is generally understood as “the successful 
implementation of a new idea”. However, as we observed 
at the outset, this popular definition in fact conflates 
innovation and invention. Sometimes innovation has 
come about directly because of a new invention – by a 
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single discovery – but innovation is almost always the 
result of a combination of factors of which a new invention 
is only one. It may be argued plausibly that Apple’s success 
in personal computer and telecommunications devices 
derives more from innovation in human interaction – and 
from its business model – than from the technological 
characteristics of its devices. The GSM standards agreed 
jointly by industry and the EU provided the matrix for 
all the innovations that opened up access to mobile 
data. The interplay between technology, systems and 
human choice is understood in the area of Information 
and Communications Technology, where profound 
intended or unintended changes in the way people utilise 
technology are routine: “social networking” is perhaps 
the most significant recent example.
All aspects of the innovation process require investment, 
but different stages of the process need different types and 
levels of support. Furthermore, investment in innovation 
depends on wider cultural and institutional contexts 
from which the knowledge and skills that support 
and sustain the activities of innovating organizations 
derive. Therefore, the uneven and localised nature of the 
innovation process is one of its key characteristics, which 
means that – given the uncertainty inherent in innovative 
experiments and ventures – conducting multiple, parallel 
research, development, demonstration, and deployment 
(RDD&D) efforts is not inherently wasteful and may in 
fact be the most effective way of exploring a radically 
new technological frontier.
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The powerful implications of this for low-carbon energy 
innovation are clear. No single technology, technology 
class, research pathway, or RDD&D investment strategy 
will unlock the technologies needed to address the 
challenge of producing affordable, reliable, scalable 
low-carbon energy technologies. Multiple innovation 
pathways are needed, as well as greater coordination 
between on-going and prospective parallel efforts.
(xi) broad, bottom-up social legitimation of policies 
is morally and practically indispensable
Innovation means rethinking how we provide energy 
and therefore how we may go beyond and beneath our 
current arrangements. Analyses of the type provided 
by energy systems and integrated assessment models 
mainly focus on large-scale systems. For example, these 
studies suggest that the major technological changes 
needed in energy systems are 1) to increase electrification 
(eg, of transportation, heating and cooling, and other 
energy services) as much as possible 2) to substantively 
de-carbonize electricity production and 3) to develop 
biofuels and other transport systems that are low- or no-
carbon. However, the systems required for those without 
access to modern energy services don’t fit that formula 
because they are to be developed in a challenging variety 
of contexts, from sparsely populated areas to dynamically 
growing cities, from areas without infrastructure to areas 
with abundant but poorly functioning infrastructure, and 
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from needs for irrigation to education to transportation 
in developing industries.
There is no simple prescription available. One size does 
not – cannot – fit all. As the 18th-century Anglo-Irish 
politician and thinker Edmund Burke correctly observed, 
“The circumstances are what render every civil and 
political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind.” The 
nuclear power that Sweden employs to light its cities 
during the dark winters is not a solution for distributed 
micro-power in savannah villages in the sun belt of 
sub-Saharan Africa. A simple pulley system may be the 
best transport option for a steep slope in Rio de Janeiro, 
much better than an engineered road and vehicles. Short-
sighted attempts to promote specific technologies in 
spite of local circumstances will invariably fail because 
they miss this basic but essential insight.
Contextual specificity is not only a sound principle 
of technical design; it is also a precondition for the 
acceptance of policies and technologies by those from 
whom decision makers derive their legitimacy to act. 
Indeed, as we will discuss below, the indispensability of 
broad, bottom-up social legitimation for fresh policies 
is the main salutary lesson of the failures of the years 
2003–2007, when international climate policy was at its 
apogee. In the years which just preceded the banking 
crash of 2008, politicians felt less inhibited in playing 
free with their constituents’ money, and taxpayers and 
consumers were themselves less attentive in monitoring 
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government levies and spending. Once that mood of 
general public well-being had evaporated, the willingness 
to sanction the legislation of expansive and expensive 
programmes was lost with it.
We need an alternative way forward. To be sure, people 
are concerned about climate change and its impacts. But 
declared attitudes are not always consistent with actions 
or, crucially, willingness to pay. A workable approach 
must genuinely engage the public in a transparent 
discussion of the costs, the benefits, and the hazards 
of proposed solutions. This of course means accepting 
the possibility that the public will not agree to what the 
policy-makers propose. But it is only if policy has been 
subjected to this assay that politicians and legislators can 
understand the limits of tolerance they can realistically 
expect from their electorates. With this knowledge, 
policies can be implemented in ways that attract rather 
than erode public support.
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 2   
reCenT exPerIenCes wITh  
enerGy InnovATIon In  
enerGy TrAnsITIon
(i) Mandated or “driven” energy transitions are 
difficult and unusual, although not impossible
Energy transitions are long-term affairs. Since the 
rise of coal power in the late 18th century, the global 
energy system has been on a slow but steady path of 
decarbonisation, as coal, oil, and gas have sequentially 
succeeded biomass and one another as the reference fuel 
in the energy mix.27 Over the intervening centuries, the 
amount of carbon emissions generated by the production 
of a unit of value (GDP) has fallen, on average, by 1.3 per 
cent per year, primarily as a result of improvements in 
energy efficiency and this fuel switching process.28 The 
challenge now is to accelerate this background rate of 
decarbonisation: to hasten the transition of the global 
energy system towards a lower and ultimately zero- or 
negative-carbon state.
Energy innovation happens continuously, at all spatial 
and temporal scales. Businesses and individuals make 
choices daily to improve their circumstances; on a longer 
time scale, industrial enterprises invest and governments 
create policies that together shape infrastructure 
spanning continents. While the frenzy of innovation 
at smaller scales is often the most visible, and may create 
THE VITAL SPARKTHE VITAL SPARK56 57
the expectation of rapid systems change, the emergent 
behaviour of the global energy system marches to a slow, 
multi-generational drum.29
Human societies have undergone two major energy 
transitions. The first was from hunter-gather societies 
to settlement-based agricultural societies, eight to ten 
thousand years ago. Energy use, dominated by biomass, 
increased by two orders of magnitude and climbed 
steadily afterwards.30 The second transition, the industrial 
revolution, began about two hundred years ago. It saw 
hydrocarbon energy sources – fossil fuels – augmenting 
humanity’s continued use of biomass, the latter mainly 
for food and fibre. 
Within this second energy transition, a clear pattern 
of the global primary energy market share is evident. 
The global energy mix is moving from a high-carbon, 
low-energy density energy mix to a low-carbon, high-
energy density mix.31 This dynamic nature of the global 
energy system is not well recognized, as is revealed by 
the frequent use of the term business-as-usual, which 
suggests that the energy system is static and unchanging. 
On the contrary, it is the usual business of all players 
in the system – individuals, businesses, industries, and 
governments – to innovate constantly. The pattern of the 
energy system that we observe is an emergent property of 
the aggregate of that innovative activity. Viewed globally, 
this process plays out over a multi-decadal time scale.
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Future innovation ideas and policies need to be 
compatible with this multi-scale environment and must 
be cognisant of the slow drum-beat of change in global 
primary energy use. The current “industrial revolution” 
energy transition began in 1800. It will likely require the 
remainder of this century to complete. The resulting 
population of 8-10 billion (according to UN projections), 
living increasingly in dense urban settlements, need to 
be served by high-energy density primary energy sources 
with low-carbon attributes. But it may not happen as 
soon as some would wish, and though we seek in this 
paper for ways to speed it up, the truth is that it is not 
clear how much this long-run process can be accelerated. 
To be sure, governments can try to impose energy 
transitions. Examples of such mandated energy transitions 
include Germany’s Energiewende and state adoption 
of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) in the United 
States. Energiewende represents Germany’s somewhat 
self-contradictory commitment to transitioning towards 
a carbon-free – and uranium-free – future through the 
subsidising of wind and solar technologies combined 
with the decommissioning of nuclear power. In the 
USA, state adoption of RPS requires utilities to acquire 
a specific percentage of their generation from renewable 
sources. Qualifying renewable facilities are provided 
with production and investment tax credits.
It is not our contention that mandated policies are fatally 
flawed sui generis. There are examples of considerable 
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success such as nuclear initiatives in Sweden and France 
or geothermal energy in Iceland, all of which achieved 
decarbonisation rates of 3 per cent per annum sustained 
for a decade or more. But each of these benefitted from 
unusual political dispensations (French centralisation 
and Scandinavian social cohesion) which are not widely 
found. The wider experience suggests that mandated 
policies are often ineffectual, and they sometimes 
produce unintended consequences. The German 
Energiewende policy has promoted significant wind and 
solar deployment with the perverse effect in the short 
run of displacing nuclear and gas-fired generation in 
favour of more carbon-intensive coal-fired generation. 
As nuclear and gas-fired power generation have declined, 
coal and lignite generation have increased. The end 
result is that there has been no net change in fossil 
fuel-fired production between 2011 and 2012. Of course, 
it may be that Germans accept this philosophically 
as just a strange twist in the winding pathway of the 
particular model of energy transition that they are 
currently exploring. But that is not entirely clear. What is 
plain that the Energiewende hasn’t yet created a 
viable renewable sector, while loading consumers 
with charges; and the emissions savings gained by 
this route have been dwarfed by the impact of cheaper 
gas elsewhere.32
In the United States, state-imposed renewable portfolio 
standards increase the amount of intermittent energy 
resources, which must be backstopped by conventional 
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generation, usually gas-fired units.33 As more intermittent 
energy resources are added to the system, maintaining 
grid reliability becomes increasingly difficult and 
expensive, with growth in management costs being 
significantly non-linear. 
There are other examples of the difficulty of mandated 
energy transitions. In order to accelerate the deployment 
of existing renewable energy technologies, the EU and 
some national governments used a mixture of legislation 
and direct funding to create lucrative markets. These were 
intended to give the favoured “renewables” a handicapped 
advantage in the market, and were predicated on the 
“peak energy” assumption that fossil fuel prices would 
continue to rise, driven by rising global demand and 
a possible “peak” in production. This amounted to a 3 
trillion Euro futures contract on high fossil fuel prices. 
It is a wager that, since 2009, worldwide but especially 
in the USA (benefitting from the effects of shale gas 
flows), has not succeeded.34
Instead, the effect of all these interventions has been to 
create a market characterised by policy uncertainty and 
investor behaviour typical of bubble markets.35 The key 
feature of bubble markets is that investors are mainly 
driven by rent-seeking: deriving profit by manipulating 
the social or political regulatory environment in which 
economic activities occur, rather than by creating or 
adding value. Such a contortion results in the “locking 
in” of favoured technologies before they have matured, 
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because the incentive to invent and innovate is snuffed 
out by competing attractions.
Thus, Europe’s provision of generous income support 
subsidies for the deployment of existing technologies 
resulted in f laccid industries. Companies in the 
subsidised low-carbon sector were vulnerable to Chinese 
competition able to under-cut European prices for a 
range of reasons, including across-the-board lower wages 
and – a point of savage irony – lower energy costs due to 
the availability of cheap coal and the absence of carbon 
penalties. Indeed, it can be reasonably argued that the 
principal economic focus in the European renewables 
market has not been on improving technologies, but 
rather on securing land-use change and long-term 
politically guaranteed income streams.
While the importance of these matters for climate 
policy is sufficiently obvious, the social implications also 
deserve our attention. Since the European renewables 
industries are dependent on markets that are the creation 
of policy mandates, their employees are in effect state 
employees, but without the security usually attributed 
to such positions. If, as seems likely, the policies are 
economically unsustainable and vulnerable to distressed 
policy correction, these jobs are at risk on short notice.
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(ii) what are the positive lessons of the decade 
2003-2013?
While the recent record of low-carbon energy policy 
has been largely one of failure to achieve significant 
decarbonisation – confirmed by the IEA’s recent report 
that the carbon intensity of the global economy has 
remained virtually static for the past twenty years – there 
have been notable successes.36 Still more importantly, 
costs have not fallen sufficiently to give a reasonable 
prospect of the sectors being independent of subsidy 
even in the medium term. (Subsidy, it must be recalled, 
is not simply direct income support. It embraces lower or 
zero connection charges, and the fact that the integration 
costs of renewables are almost always socialised over the 
rest of the system – as in Britain.)
However, the experiment in the mandated deployment of 
low carbon energy has yielded a vast body of data relating 
to the performance and systems integration of renewable 
technologies, particularly in the electricity sector (much 
is also being learned in the fields of transport and heating 
fuels). Even though a great deal of this information is 
not yet fully available to analysts, it is clear that investors 
and innovators alike can learn enormously from full 
disclosure of such data. Therefore one positive lesson to 
be drawn from that experience hitherto is that any future 
developments that are funded from consumer levies or 
taxation must be completely transparent.
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The importance of this data resource should not be 
underestimated. The energy sector in most countries, 
even in long-standing liberal democracies, has been 
characterized by secrecy and obscurity. The low-carbon 
experiment has exposed the industry to unprecedented 
public scrutiny, and created a context in which consumers 
are pressing to know more about the conduct and 
behaviour of energy providers and their regulators. This is 
a unique opportunity to prise open a previously cloistered 
industry, which would ultimately foster invention and 
innovation in the general interest.
Indeed, while it is common for governments and NGOs to 
lament the lack of public awareness of climate change, we 
think that a second positive lesson is that the experience 
of the last decade, certainly in relation to energy, indicates 
that a remarkably sophisticated debate can be created 
within a short period of time and the right institutional 
frameworks and incentives. The results of that discussion 
cannot be predicted, but this is a hazard that is far 
outweighed by the benefits of engaging as many minds 
as possible. In this extraordinary development, data 
gathering and disclosure will be a key element, firstly to 
provide material for investors and innovators, but also 
as part of the process of securing broad public consent 
to the changes and experiments necessary, a point that 
we discuss further in relation to our understanding of 
the term “ambition” in these endeavours.
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Other subsidiary benefits are worth noting. The pace 
of systems change can be very rapid if adopters believe 
investment to be worthwhile. Indeed, there is good reason 
to think that when the attractiveness of a technology is 
more than skin-deep, adoption will spread very quickly 
indeed. The example of shale gas exploitation, given 
below, demonstrates this in another context.
While modern biomass may be limited in its ultimate 
deployment, it is interesting and important to note that it 
is the heavy lifter in the renewable electricity sector, and 
that it has made its way almost unnoticed by the public. 
In the UK, for example, as earlier noted more than half of 
all “green” megawatt hours of electrical energy generated 
between 2002 and 2012 were from biomass sources. 
The biomass case also suggests that once affordability 
is reached and the problem of uncontrolled variability 
is tackled, and low-carbon technology is competitive, 
growth in other technologies could be prompt.
A third major positive trend of the last decade has been 
the rising level of acceptance of the energy innovation 
imperative by politicians and policy makers. Although 
battles continue to rage over the relative importance of the 
deployment of existing technologies and the development 
of new ones as government funding priorities, the notion 
that energy innovation is key to addressing climate change 
now enjoys considerable support. Political winds are 
ever-shifting, but at least for now the consensus on 
energy innovation seems to cross the political boundaries, 
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creating new and potentially productive alliances. 
Politicians in polarised political systems are far more 
likely to agree on measures to improve energy technology 
than other sorts of climate-oriented policies, such as 
carbon pricing.
A good example is of the strong bipartisan governmental 
support for ARPA-E, the US Department of Energy’s 
newly established energy technology development arm. 
This effort has sustained support across the political 
spectrum because it taps into a vision shared by all US 
politicians: of the US as an innovative, world-leading 
technology producer. Unlike the US cap-and-trade bill 
of 2009/2010, which failed to gain passage even after 
enormous concessions by its sponsors and supporters, 
ARPA-E embodies the desire, shared by politicians 
and the public, to achieve industrial competitiveness, 
national renewal, and “blue sky” innovation.
Simultaneous with the rise of political support for 
energy innovation has been a significant expansion of 
scientific and technical attention towards the challenge 
of developing low-carbon energy. This has been driven 
partly by improved funding, through initiatives such 
as ARPA-E and, more expansively, through increased 
funding from national scientific bodies such as the 
National Sciences Foundation in the US, the Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) in the 
UK, and analogous bodies elsewhere. Such funding has 
permitted a generation of new energy-related research 
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projects to begin. It has also attracted scientists and 
engineers from a diverse array of disciplines, from 
computational biologists modelling algal growth, to 
power systems engineers working on electrical grid 
demand response, to a new generation of nuclear 
scientists developing advanced, passively safe nuclear 
designs including fast reactors and small modular 
reactors (SMRs).
A further positive development in lower-carbon 
energy – and an instructive example of how innovative 
technologies can be brought to market at scale – is the 
development of technology to unlock vast quantities of 
natural gas from previously uneconomic shale deposits, 
particularly in the United States.
Natural gas, including shale gas, is a cleaner fuel than 
oil or coal. It can be burned more efficiently, with 
significantly reduced emissions of greenhouse gases 
per kilowatt-hour generated. Furthermore, it is low in 
sulphur, and does not produce the levels of black carbon 
from imperfect combustion typical of coal or oil. This 
latter point is a particularly valuable characteristic given 
the increasingly clear role played by black carbon as a 
local environmental pollutant, a risk to human health 
and as an agent which, by deposition upon it, accelerates 
the melting of ice.37
Gas can substitute relatively easily for coal in power 
generation and its considerably lower release of carbon 
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dioxide (around 40 per cent that of coal, per unit of 
electricity generated) means that it has the potential to 
deliver significant net emissions reduction, assuming 
minimal natural gas leakage between well and generator.
The United States government has laid the institutional 
and regulatory groundwork for a massive expansion 
of shale gas exploration and exploitation over the past 
twenty years: through a combination of federally-funded 
geological research, the availability of GPS navigation 
(itself a by-product of government defence investments), 
public-private collaboration on demonstration projects, 
and R&D priorities set and exploited through the 
American Gas Institute.38 Other factors, such as the 
nature of land-tenure in the USA, (mineral resources are 
owned by the territorial land-owners), combined with 
tax policy support for unconventional technologies and 
the buccaneering of wildcat drillers to prove the first 
major new fields have also helped drive this expansion. 
The shale gas boom has in recent years reached new and 
unforeseen heights, transforming the United States in 
the process.
To the consternation of those who had become used to 
deriding the United States as a “climate change pariah” 
for its refusal to sign up to the Kyoto Protocol process, 
the shale gas revolution has helped enable the US to 
reduce its power sector’s carbon emissions faster than 
any other country worldwide between 2005 and the 
present. Its performance is well ahead of the European 
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Union, which had prided itself on leading global climate 
diplomacy but where, as noted earlier, the actual effect 
of its aggressively promoted “green” energy policies has 
arguably been culturally, socially and politically – as well 
as economically – counterproductive: in nice Hegelian 
form, the dogmatic and uncompromising presentation 
of this thesis has predictably conjured up its equivalent 
antithesis. Nor have the opportunity/costs of pursuing 
these options been negligible. Nor should one discount 
the discouraging effect of presenting an economically 
uncompelling example to the developing world. 
Furthermore the cost of energy for industrial purposes 
in the US compared to other regions, including China, 
dropped significantly. There was an initial oversupply 
that is now being corrected by the market; but at one 
point in 2012 gas was trading at $2 mmbtu (million 
British Thermal Units) in the USA and $14 mmbtu 
in Europe — a spread exacerbated by the difficulty 
and cost of transporting natural gas overseas.39 As a 
result, more energy intensive industries have begun 
to return to the USA, bringing manufacturing jobs in 
their wake. The heavy chemical industry has been in the 
lead, reanimating the previously depressed economies 
of states like Ohio.40 Given coal’s vast market share in 
global electricity generation–in particular in the large 
developing economies where energy demand growth 
is likely to be highest – expanding the substitution of 
gas for coal could deliver meaningful global emissions 
benefits. However, shale gas should not be regarded as 
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a “destination” fuel: a final stop in our global energy 
transition. At most, it can provide a “gas bridge” 
generating the wealth and the public consent that will 
make it possible to reach still lower-carbon electricity.
In addition to improving the carbon emissions profile 
of the United States, and strengthening its economy, 
the development and maturation of shale gas extraction 
technology offers further insights into how best to 
encourage similarly rapid progress in other fields. In the 
1980s and 1990s, when private R&D was low and risks 
to industry high, the federally-supported Eastern Gas 
Shales Project, the federally-coordinated Gas Research 
Institute, and federally-administered tax incentives in 
the United States filled the investment gap – bridged the 
investment “valley of death” – and prompted sustained 
private interest and investment in longer-term shale gas 
development. They provided a secure policy environment, 
which gave innovators sufficient confidence to invest 
their own efforts and resources, as well as a crucial early 
investment support that the market would probably not 
have provided on its own.41
The economic payoffs of these efforts have been enormous. 
Even the most generous estimates of federal spending 
on decades of shale gas development have been repaid 
many times over in the form of increased domestic energy 
production, lower energy costs, increased economic 
activity, and additional tax revenue. Estimates of shale 
gas investments total more than $10 billion over several 
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decades, including $473 million in R&D support, but the 
direct gains to US consumers from the shale revolution 
have been estimated at over $100 billion each year.42 And 
this does not even include the substantial macroeconomic 
effects of low-cost energy and new jobs, or the geopolitical 
dividend that comes from producing a larger share of 
energy domestically.
(iii) what were the principal failures of the 
decade 2003-2013?
The experiences of the last decade have revealed that the 
principal failing of current policy mechanisms is the fact 
that bureaucratic preference has been permitted to replace 
real world experience in the selection of technologies. 
To the extent that taxpayer or consumer funds are used 
to fund technological initiatives, it should be used not 
to support individual companies or technologies, but 
rather to support key strategic technological platforms 
such as technology-agnostic test-beds, basic science and 
R&D activity, demonstration support, and competitive, 
innovation-focused deployment regimes.43
More broadly, a central lesson to be learned from the 
experiments of the last decade is that a failure to bear in 
mind the economic interests of consumers, industrial, 
commercial, and domestic, has weakened international 
climate change policy by stimulating consumer hostility 
and resistance. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
government admits that the direct consumer costs of its 
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climate policies will be about £7.6 billion a year in 2020,44 
with the details of these costs now regularly producing 
front page headlines in mass circulation papers.45 This 
risks not only a consequent collapse of public confidence, 
but a potentially universal loss of faith in an entire set of 
protocols. Policies that respect the economic sensitivities 
of their supporting populations will be more likely to 
produce innovations that are durable and attractive 
at a global level (an expansion of the simple truth of 
Pielke’s Iron Law). This has profound implications for 
how national and international policies are constructed, 
and it is to these challenges that we now turn.
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 3   
hArTweLLIAn oPTIons For  
nATIonAL LeveL ACTIons
(i) stimulate energy innovation through more 
intelligent investment
Technologies may involve the manipulation of inanimate 
materials and natural forces, but they are above all human 
systems. The history of technology shows that technology 
development is a process characterized by both supply 
push and demand pull. The lone inventor is usually a 
fiction, but even he or she – or, more likely, teams of 
inventors and innovators – produce an artefact that is 
modified in development and use and set in a context of 
new infrastructures and rules. These processes in turn 
stimulate further innovations in supporting systems 
and artefacts, forming what Rip and Kemp call a “socio-
technical” system.46
Successful energy innovation policy must be able 
to account for this. It must install institutions and 
incentives that foster organic, bottom-up innovation 
whilst providing the top-down organising principles that 
enable complementary ideas and assets to be integrated. 
It should provide the landmarks for ambition, funding 
and the sharing of risk and reward.
Innovation in energy provision will require the right 
relationships between discovery and problem-driven 
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research, demonstrators, prototype deployments, 
human behaviour and societal evolution. Given the 
great diversity of disciplines involved, the essential “eco-
system” is unlikely to happen by chance. 
Contrary to popular assumptions and those of most 
policy-makers, technology does not have an over-riding 
prescriptive power. If that over-riding power is granted, 
as we have seen, the results are more likely to be different 
from what was intended and often unpleasantly so. It is 
when this plethora of factors are balanced in counterpoint 
to each other that a truly self-sustaining technology is 
liable to be fashioned.
Sectoral characteristics must speak: what works in ICT 
may not transfer to nanotechnology, and so forth. So too 
must national and local context: geography, infrastructure, 
workforce skills, venture capital, industrial policy, market 
forces, political institutions, cultural norms and traditions 
of expertise must all be taken into account to achieve true 
success and popular legitimacy. It is therefore encouraging 
that research on technical innovation is increasingly focused 
on national systems of innovation, emphasizing the 
interdependence of these factors.47 Only national sovereign 
actors are empowered to make decisive interventions: the 
shale gas story told in section 3 illustrates that.
The overall aim for national innovation policy must 
be to generate conditions in which private and public 
organizations engage in the ways suggested, and 
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principally “up-stream.” To expand such conditions will 
require better targeting of innovation-oriented spending. 
Given recent negative experiences in the subsidy-driven 
deployment of various renewable technologies, national 
innovation policies should be targeted towards driving 
down the future cost of promising technologies rather 
than deploying expensive, immature technologies at 
scale. We recognise, however, that deployment is a 
necessary component in the process of technological 
maturation. Thus, we favour a strategy with a bias towards 
the most rapid improvement of technology rather 
than the widest possible early deployment. This means 
that for immature and swiftly changing technologies, 
deployment should be pursued as a means to reduce cost 
and improve performance, not simply as an end in itself.
Another challenge lies in the timing and sequencing of 
actions, both for innovation and deployment. On the one 
hand, pushing deployment action into the future may 
allow relevant technologies to become more affordable, 
making unit-costs of low-carbon technology – and 
therefore emissions mitigation – less costly. This is so 
in the case of renewable energy: unit costs of energy 
from gas plants with carbon capture and storage (CSS), 
advanced biofuels, off-shore wind turbines, and solar 
cells are projected to go down substantially. On the other 
hand, the present economic crisis means idle capacity, 
not least in the labour market, as well as historically 
low interest rates. This suggests pushing forward “no-
regrets” investments such as energy-efficient retrofitting 
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of building stocks and the modernisation of transmission 
and distribution networks.48 Such investments will 
stimulate economic activity without resulting in the 
long-term lock-in of costly, suboptimal technologies.
Demonstrations are particularly important because the 
demonstration phase is currently a bottleneck: a rate-
limiting step in the process of commercializing new, 
low-carbon energy technologies. During demonstration, 
low-carbon technologies can be tested for “scalability”, not 
primarily to achieve environmental goals but rather as a 
means of driving down production and management costs 
so as to bring technologies closer to market competitiveness 
and, by extension, spontaneous market adoption. 
Only once technologies have passed this step should 
deployment at scale be pursued. Once pursued, such 
levels of deployment should be driven largely by broad, 
market-based, instruments targeting externalities or 
resource scarcity, rather than technology-specific policies 
designed to incentivise widespread deployment of a 
favoured technology.
This framework is presented in a linear fashion, but it 
must be recognized that technologies and information 
and learning do not progress linearly through this process. 
Numerous feedbacks exist within and between each 
process. Effective innovation networks will integrate 
and embed these policies and stages within national 
innovation systems. 
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(ii) overcome the limitations of institutions and 
make incentives work as they should
Public authorities, government institutions, and civil 
society are all party to the process of incentivising 
decarbonisation because a low-carbon economy is 
ultimately a public good unlikely to be delivered without 
government involvement. The question is not whether 
government should participate in the provision of 
this public good, but how. On which level, and with 
what instruments, should government policy measures 
operate so that they help and do not hinder? There is 
now considerable experience in the use of certain types 
of incentives, but results have been mixed. We have 
an opportunity to look imaginatively at the levers 
to hand and to develop strategies for encouraging 
beneficial innovation.
At present, most private firms have limited incentives 
to undertake innovation that leads to cleaner or more 
affordable energy, unless they receive some guarantee 
of return in markets that would otherwise be too risky. 
But remove that risk entirely and we immediately face 
problems of rent-seeking (as discussed in section 2 (i)). 
Subsidies can easily distort markets with unintended 
consequences and therefore should be used sparingly and 
with care. Where they are used, they should be structured 
to foster and demand innovation and to minimise 
rent-seeking.49 Other incentives such as funding for 
demonstrators, soft loans, guarantees linked to future 
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purchasing plans, and sharing of risk/return should all be 
considered and deployed where sensible. Alongside this, 
one of the most important ways to incentivise investment 
is consistency in government and regulatory policy.
There are some existing guidelines and best practices. 
Incentives and subsidies for fossil fuels should be 
abolished. Energy efficiency should be incentivised, 
particularly where it can be done at “negative cost”, 
not because this will result in a one-to-one emissions 
reduction, which generally will not occur (see the earlier 
discussion of the Jevons Paradox), but because it makes 
good economic sense. It can be popular amongst the public 
if implemented consensually and to clear co-benefit.
The same is unlikely for a uniform global carbon price. 
This has been advocated in part as an alternative to 
global carbon trading systems that have dominated 
international experimentation heretofore, and have 
by and large failed.50 But though a universal carbon tax 
might be less complicated, its agreement and successful 
implementation seem just as far-fetched as a global 
trading system, or indeed a global treaty on climate. 
Domestic carbon taxes are a more plausible approach: if 
low and hypothecated, as we recommended in the 2010 
Hartwell Paper, such taxes could become a useful way of 
raising funds for clean energy invention and innovation.
Incentives should also be in place for improving 
the environmental and technical performance and 
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decreasing the cost of currently existing fossil energy 
sources, as discussed in the previous section. Where 
high carbon energy is needed and is the only realistic 
option in the short term, (for example in poor countries 
committed to expanding their power supply but lacking 
other options for large-scale baseload power generation), 
policy incentives should be predicated on the use of 
state-of-the-art technologies such as fluidized bed 
combustion, ultra-supercritical coal-fired generators, 
or the substitution of gas for coal. Gas substitution may 
soon be viable in South Africa and Brazil, for example. 
These developments can become bridges to otherwise 
unreachable places. It is, in our view, short-sighted 
and self-defeating to deny ourselves these bridges on 
the basis of an undifferentiated anathema proclaimed 
upon all fossil fuels.
On the local and regional level, different incentives will 
work for different contexts. In all cases, public support 
is crucial and can only be won if climate policies are 
attractive to communities. Side payments could offer a 
pragmatic solution in such debates, as could ownership 
arrangements that provide greater financial and social 
incentives to local stakeholders who would otherwise 
oppose projects. For example, in Great Britain there is 
strong opposition to wind farms, which is largely absent 
in Germany. Whereas British wind farms are owned by 
big utility firms, and neighbours, who pay a significant 
environmental cost, see no benefit, Germany has a 
long history of substantive ownership by co-operatives 
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that serve to return wealth to those most affected by a 
development. Such local ownership will not resolve all 
conflicts of interest, and it may also expose local owners 
to investment risks of a kind that are unreasonable 
given their particular circumstances. Nevertheless, local 
involvement is a key principle that deserves more than 
the lip service it currently receives from government. 
Here, the case of mineral rights ownership in the US 
shale gas revolution is instructive.
(iii) Pursue “nationally Appropriate Innovation 
Actions” that satisfy many national requirements
Each nation state has its own national priority agenda. In 
resource-poor Japan, which relies on imported fossil fuels 
for its energy supply, the highest priority of politicians is 
to develop a secure supply of non-imported energy. This is 
why Japan (in its 2010 energy policy) set a national objective 
of generating a 50 per cent share of its power supply from 
nuclear power. It is also why, following the tsunami damage 
to the nuclear site at Fukushima and the subsequent wobble 
in public support for nuclear power, it is exploring the 
development of sub-sea methane hydrates for the medium 
to long term as well as vigorously reforming governance of 
its nuclear sector and at last improving interconnectivity 
between the Eastern and Western sections of the Japanese 
electricity grid from 1 to 2-3 GW.
Individual circumstances and varying conditions – 
environmental, social, political – mean that countries 
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choose to focus on differing areas of technology. In 
China, which has a rich domestic coal supply but now 
faces serious air pollution problems due to particulate 
emissions from coal power stations, the clean usage 
of domestic coal may be a higher priority than energy 
security. In Sweden, where supply is secure and relatively 
clean due to an abundance of existing nuclear and 
hydroelectric power stations, declining costs and 
building an export market may be higher priorities 
than in energy-poor nations elsewhere.
The elementary point that these cases make is that 
each nation’s technological innovation agenda will be 
directed primarily by its perceived national priorities 
and not necessarily by international policy goals such as 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction. The extent to which 
the reduction of greenhouse gases will be considered 
a priority problem in any individual country will be 
principally a function of the degree to which that goal 
overlaps with other, more pressing domestic priorities.
Nor is that political fact of life unwelcome. Today we 
can see that considerable greenhouse gas mitigation 
has, in fact, taken place as a result of policies primarily 
directed towards other, higher priority goals such as job 
creation, energy security, industrial development, social 
objectives or domestic competitive advantage. This is 
a virtuous dynamic, insofar as it provides additional 
political openings for an effective reduction of humanity’s 
global impact.
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Such openings have largely been absent in recent years. 
Their scarcity is what prompted the 2010 Hartwell Paper 
to call for an “oblique” approach to climate change, giving 
priority to actions with different prime motivation, but 
with the contingent benefit of reducing human impact 
on the environment. The pursuit of unconventional 
gas development technologies in Japan and clean coal 
technologies in China – policy approaches not motivated 
primarily by climate change concerns – are instructive. 
Not only do these policy approaches help these countries 
address national priorities, thereby gaining democratic 
legitimacy and the support of politicians, but they 
also promote beneficial climate change outcomes by 
improving technology that limits the worst practice 
use and negative consequences of coal.
The discovery that domestic policy actions can be 
harnessed in the service of a general lightening of the 
weight of humanity’s footprint suggests a strategy of 
privileging local and national-level solutions while 
optimizing them for maximal global impact.
The simultaneously local and global characteristics of the 
innovations needed to address climate change translate 
into the pursuit of “Nationally Appropriate Innovation 
Actions” (NAIAs) as an important stepping-stone for future 
activities around which global actors can unite. Such a 
programme would include efforts as diverse as the Brazilian 
rural electrification programme Luz para todos (“light for 
all”), and US investments in high-tech energy innovation 
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through ARPA-E – all of which employ local resources to 
achieve local priorities but have contingent global benefits.
Perhaps the most promising aspect of the NAIA approach 
is that it is compatible with the international diplomacy 
of global climate change under the auspices of the 
UNFCCC. For years this well-meaning process has been 
mostly fruitless, and it shows few signs of improvement. 
But the sunk political capital and institutional inertia 
that scaffold the entire process mean that it is with us to 
stay, at least in the medium-term. Therefore, we should 
take advantage of the opportunity to harness the good 
intentions that remain within it to re-direct the process 
with procedural reform and to refresh it with new ideas.
NAIAs harmonize particularly well with the emerging 
discourse on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(NAMAs), which, after the Durban COP meeting, are 
rapidly displacing the Kyoto Protocol type of global 
treaty model as the preferred direction of the geopolitical 
majority of UNFCCC participants. In a global policy model 
based on NAMAs, NAIAs will serve as the vehicles through 
which individual countries implement their nationally 
agreed commitments. These will form the substance 
of a successful future international discourse, which is 
politically desirable, and will also achieve success in both 
mitigation of emissions and adaptation to climate change.
Just how this may be done is discussed in more detail 
in the next section.
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 4   
hArTweLLIAn oPTIons For 
InTernATIonAL LeveL ACTIons
(i) understand and implement the positive 
lessons from the failure of the Kyoto regime
The hybrid offspring of a nuclear arms control treaty 
and the US Sulphur Trading regime, with added features 
from the Montreal Protocol on CFCs, the Kyoto Protocol 
was always maladapted for the nature of the “wicked” 
problem that it was supposed to solve.51 Beyond the 
fundamental structural mismatch, there were three 
additional reasons of diplomatic practice why the Kyoto 
protocol failed.
First, the top-down nature of the approach did not 
give adequate consideration to the unique situations of 
individual countries, specifically the differential ability 
and willingness to pay more for low-carbon energy 
provision than fossil fuel alternatives.
Secondly, the economic power balance between 
developed countries and developing countries changed 
dramatically during the fifteen years between 1997, when 
the protocol was agreed, and 2012, when the protocol 
was to begin its second commitment period.
Finally, the emissions reductions the protocol prescribed 
were unrealistic in the absence of low-carbon technology 
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capable of meeting them at costs deemed sufficiently 
affordable by political leaders and their constituencies.
All of these factors combined together to create a 
widespread perception amongst politicians that 
adherence to the Kyoto Protocol would damage national 
economic competitiveness and destroy wealth, and that 
the level of damage would be disproportionate to the 
real-world impact that the Protocol could have on global 
emissions. Nor were they wrong. Following the economic 
crisis of 2007/2008, many countries decided that the 
impacts of Kyoto on national competitiveness, real or 
perceived, were no longer politically or economically 
affordable. Emerging economies such as China and 
India took the view that their economic development 
would be constrained if they committed to obligations 
under the Protocol, while developed countries, most 
prominently the United States, thought that the lack 
of commitment by those countries would be unfair and 
would dilute the agreement’s effectiveness. 
In countries that had signed the protocol, the expense 
of meeting targets with existing low-carbon technology 
– and the perception that doing so was decreasing 
competitiveness with non-signatories – reduced 
enthusiasm and political support. Together, these factors 
resulted in diplomatic gridlock, the erosion of institutional 
momentum within the UNFCCC, and the rejection of the 
second commitment period by several important emitter 
countries including Japan, Canada, and Russia.
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What lessons does this history teach for the design of 
a more modest but possibly more successful reform of 
the UNFCCC diplomatic process? We see seven.
First, the international process should adopt a bottom-
up approach to decreasing global carbon intensity by 
reducing carbon intensities across all industries, sectors, 
and countries. The technologies used to achieve these 
reductions in carbon intensity need to be identified 
by each industry, and shared and adopted widely in 
locally appropriate forms. Carbon intensity goals for 
each industry and sector can be calculated on the 
basis of their current carbon intensity, their potential 
to apply existing, commercially available technology, 
and prevailing and projected rates of technological 
improvement. Aggregating the targets of all industries 
and sectors can then result in bottom-up, self-chosen 
targets for individual countries. Recognising the reality of 
sovereign power is what may enable it to succeed. When 
targets are self-chosen in collaboration with competitor 
companies across industries, sectors, and countries, the 
likelihood of them being met is greater.
Second, the international process should abandon top-
down target setting and instead embrace a wider range 
of progress indicators such as sectoral decarbonisation 
targets, R&D spending targets, and carbon intensity 
targets. A pragmatic approach, giving more respect to 
sovereign power, has already been tested with considerable 
success in the emissions field. In 2007, leaders of the Asia-
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Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum agreed to a 
25 per cent energy intensity improvement goal by 2030. 
Four years later, meeting in Honolulu, and responding to 
contextual shifts and changed technological and economic 
conditions, they agreed to raise the improvement goal to 
45 per cent by 2035.52
Third, the framework must be structured to induce 
sufficient carbon intensity improvements in a transparent 
manner with institutionalized Measurement, Reporting, 
and Verification (MRV) standards and peer-review 
methodologies –though without necessarily being legally 
binding. Results are more important than modalities. 
Past UNFCCC negotiations show that the pursuit of 
“legally binding” commitments for their own sake is not 
productive. The US and China are together responsible 
for over half of global carbon emissions, and neither is 
likely to accept any legally binding agreement. 
Again, the APEC example is instructive. The energy 
intensity commitments that countries have accepted are 
not legally binding, though they are supported by strong 
peer-review measures. When the goals of a country are 
not achieved, the peer-review process does not impose 
penalties on the failing country. If this were the case, 
several key participants would probably not have agreed 
to participate. Rather, countries failing to meet targets 
are offered detailed policy recommendations informed 
by best practice from other participating countries.
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Fourth, a future framework will involve an expanded 
set of actors across all scales and types: global, regional, 
multilateral, bilateral, and sectoral. While the UN 
should still play a role in fields such as rule-making or 
the management of peer review processes, there will be a 
larger executive role for other agents. There will be a role 
for regional processes such as the East Asia Low Carbon 
Growth Partnership, Energy Efficiency Initiatives in 
the East Asia Summit, and APEC. There will be a role 
for sectoral processes such as APP/GSEP, or low carbon 
initiatives by international industry associations such as 
steel, cement, chemical and aluminium), or for bilateral 
credit mechanisms, such as Japan’s, discussed below. 
There may also be a role for Sino-American agreements 
both on collaborative RD&D and to seek to phase out 
HFCs – assuming that Sino-American relations in 
general remain sufficiently open (which they may not) 
to permit this type of diplomacy. Embracing such 
“fragmentation” is a positive step toward pragmatism 
governing the diplomatic process, and hence towards 
concrete results.
Fifth, it must at least be acknowledged that the trajectory 
of global emissions will almost certainly overshoot an 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration of 450ppm 
in the next few decades. It is irresponsible to ignore 
the possibility that this could happen. On 9th May 
2013, the Mauna Loa Observatory confirmed that the 
Keeling curve, which has measured global atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentrations since 1958 (when the 
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level was 318 ppm), had passed a daily average of 400 
ppm. A positive consequence of candour is that it will 
concentrate minds and funding more on the search for 
low-carbon technology to slow this trend and negative 
carbon technologies capable of reversing it for the latter 
half of the 21st century.
Sixth, there should be more effort devoted to the invention 
of next generation low-carbon technologies. To date, 
international negotiations have put disproportionate 
emphasis on the transfer of existing technologies rather 
than the development of new ones. The debate on 
technology transfer has often been dominated by fruitless 
discussion over Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). There 
is considerable room for international collaboration 
among interested parties from both developed and 
developing countries. Again, much of this could be better 
handled outside the UN, through existing multilateral 
and bi-lateral channels.
Seventh, the resilience and safety of vulnerable countries 
and populations as CO2 levels continue to rise will 
commensurately increase in importance. Acknowledging 
the potential failure of stringent mitigation is a moral and 
political prerequisite if we are to take prudent actions to 
adapt to climate change. Moreover, as we highlighted in 
the 2010 Hartwell Paper, the imperative for adaptation 
is not just a future concern, it is also a vital issue for 
the present. Many populations are maladapted to their 
current climatic conditions, and we need to improve 
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all communities’ resilience to the vagaries of extreme 
weather, whatever its cause.
The second commitment period of the Kyoto protocol covers 
less than 20 per cent of global emissions, and enthusiasm 
and commitment seem to decline by the day. At Doha, in 
practice the UNFCCC process crossed a bridge from the old 
regime to the new. While vested interests at the UNFCCC 
have a continuing commitment to a top-down, target-
oriented approach, in fact that old regime was a one-issue 
process and this approach is now a dead end. Furthermore 
it is unclear, and not agreed within UNFCCC, who pays the 
costs either of proposed actions or even the continuation 
of the UNFCCC process. One hundred and ninety nations 
were present in Doha, but there was no strong pushback 
from governments at Doha against the recognition of 
the need for new directions, a marked contrast with the 
situation only a few years previously. 
Some European nations – distinct from the EU secretariats 
– are seeking new ideas. The governments of developing 
countries seem to be changing their positions, becoming 
more constructive and pragmatic. Many green activist 
groups continue to reject all new ideas; but some may 
accept the need for change.
The prominence of NGOs highlights a specific problem 
with the UNFCCC. International negotiations – for 
example, world trade talks – tend to be chaotic in their 
nature, but climate change negotiations are “super, super 
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chaotic” Part of the reason for this is that governmental 
negotiators are not just interacting with the negotiators 
of other governments, but with individuals throughout 
global society who are now able to observe the discussions 
almost in real time through modern media, and to 
interject in those negotiations through equally well-
publicised expressions of public opinion. With so 
many unregulated inputs, the negotiation process – 
unsurprisingly – becomes more than merely complex. 
A football game in which the field is occupied not only 
by several teams at once but also the spectators, all of 
them attempting to play the ball, is hardly likely to be 
an easy match to follow, let alone referee.
Rescuing something from this situation, and overcoming 
the super chaotic nature of the interaction, has become 
all the more important because the Kyoto Protocol 
process is dying, and has been for several years. However, 
and in spite of its known weaknesses, the goals of the 
UNFCCC – to increase international collaboration and 
national efforts to reduce the dangers of climate change 
and increase societal resilience to its impacts – remain 
of the utmost importance.
The traditional UNFCCC toolkit, included the 
deployment agenda, Cap and Trade (C&T), the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), technology transfer, 
and a unifying focus on CO2 equivalents. It is inadequate. 
Evolution towards Nationally Appropriate Innovation 
Actions (“pledge-and-review” NAMAs and now NAIAs) 
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is the appropriate route, with each nation undertaking 
as much as it can to reduce its own emissions as rapidly 
as possible while meeting its development imperatives.
However, improving ambition and the ability to increase 
national mitigation and adaptation objectives rests 
on invention and innovation, and will fail without it. 
That is to say that without the improvement of existing 
technological options and the development of new ones, 
there will be little appetite for more ambitious attempts 
to reduce emissions since to achieve them at costs that 
taxpayers and consumers are willing to bear, will be 
manifestly infeasible.
The “theory of change” at the core of the UNFCCC is a 
Politics of Limits (resulting in inappropriate tools such as 
Cap and Trade and the Clean Development Mechanism), 
and has not been successful. Instead we should establish 
a “theory of change” that promotes innovation and 
Nationally Appropriate Innovation Actions. Whether or 
not the UNFCCC continues, a new framework is needed 
that offers a more compelling, efficacious, and politically 
saleable pathway forward.
At one time, there was a strong US wish to shift the 
primary focus from the UNFCCC to the Asia-Pacific 
Partnership (APP), seconded most strongly by 
Australia and Japan.53 Progress was made: industry had 
a verification process and a list of ways to calculate 
emissions for specific forms of energy. But the APP was 
cancelled when President Obama came into power, and 
THE VITAL SPARKTHE VITAL SPARK92 93
there was also a change of government in Australia. Its 
replacement is the Clean Energy Ministerial, which is 
more technical than diplomatic or social-scientific. The 
Global Superior Energy Partnership (GSEP) has been 
initiated under the Clean Energy Ministerial. GSEP 
does not have sufficient political backing yet to move 
forward, but there is potential because it involves fewer 
countries than the UNFCCC and therefore suffers less 
from the intense chaos referred to above.
The Japanese announcement at Durban that it would 
henceforth focus upon bi-lateral and smaller group 
initiatives was influential in changing the terms of the 
debate. It also showed that if countries show cooperative 
achievement outside the UNFCCC, it may influence 
negotiators within it, and could also influence the 
developing countries that are major emitters.
Ambitious pragmatism defines a path forward for 
sustainable growth to a high-energy planet with a low 
environmental footprint. The seven lessons from the 
Kyoto Protocol experience, outlined above, can help 
give shape to this more viable diplomatic process – a 
bridge to the future. But caution is necessary. We must 
not repeat the mistake of the Kyoto era and construct “a 
bridge too far”: negotiators and diplomats must see the 
bridge as viable. Especially, we must resist the standard 
temptation to see new solutions as necessarily “high 
tech” or implemented from the top down.
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(ii) recognise and accommodate the interests of 
different parties in a transfer of new technology
No global emissions reductions strategy will succeed 
without the transfer of low-carbon technology from 
early-adopting nations, either in the developed or 
developing world, to those countries lagging behind. 
Significantly greater attention and institutional energy 
must therefore be invested in next-generation technology 
transfer schemes.
Such schemes could take many forms. One potentially 
promising model is an evolution and simplification of the 
CDM system: the bilateral credit agreement. Under this 
model, countries with advanced low-carbon technologies 
provide state-of-the-art technology to lagging countries in 
exchange for a share of the resulting emissions reduction 
“credits”. This model was announced by Japan at the 
Durban COP as its preferred way forward. Such schemes 
are not currently allowed within the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), despite their 
clear benefits. These include a lower bureaucratic burden 
for the issuance and distribution of credits than currently 
exists under the CDM, as well as applicability to a wider 
variety of low-carbon technologies, including CCS/
CCU and ultra-efficient coal-fired power plants, which 
can scale back significantly the impact of otherwise 
unabated fossil fuel use. Such bi-lateral credit schemes 
hold particular interest for energy-intensive economic 
sectors, where prevailing technology in many of the 
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largest global economies lags far behind the best available 
technology, sometimes by decades.
Across all technology-oriented negotiations through 
the UNFCCC, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
have emerged as one of the most critical – and most 
contentious – issues. While developed countries tend to 
insist that it is absolutely necessary to maintain strong 
IPR arrangements to provide incentives for technology 
development, developing countries assert that such 
arrangements are the most damaging obstacle to 
effective technology transfer. Free licensing of green 
technologies under such instruments as the Agreement 
on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), they argue, is at once morally, politically, and 
economically attractive.
What is lacking in this debate is recognition of the fact 
that, despite the hyperbole of some advocates, we simply 
do not currently possess sufficiently high-performance, 
low-cost, and low-carbon energy technology to ensure 
a sustainable supply of low-carbon energy at affordable 
prices to the billions of people whose support is required 
if the policy is to succeed. Energy technology innovation 
must be promoted, and common sense says that IPR 
is essential to protect profitability. Without that 
assurance, not enough private sector money will flow 
into energy innovation R&D. So there is a trade-off, and 
the temptation to over-ride the secure market incentive 
structures must be avoided.
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An underappreciated aspect of this debate is that 
most of the energy-saving and low-carbon energy 
technologies needed in the coming decades will be 
assemblies of knowledge, not isolated technologies 
such as the chemical compositions of individual drugs. 
Consequently, industrial sectors with remarkable success 
stories to their credit, (and the pharmaceuticals industry 
is an obvious one), have only limited relevance as models. 
The energy innovations that we are seeking will be 
systems of systems: a combination of many materials and 
forces, all of which “plug into” existing socio-technical 
structures. Therefore, transfer in energy technologies 
involves the transfer of complex manufacturing and 
operational know-how in addition to the simple licensing 
of patents. This is a process that can only be achieved 
by close, mutually constructive cooperation between 
providers and recipients of new technologies. 
For this reason, if the monopoly of new and important 
technologies by companies in developed countries 
really hinders technology transfer – as developing 
world governments argue it does – a resolution will 
only be achieved through consultative processes deemed 
acceptable by all stakeholders. Compulsory licensing, an 
often discussed alternative, will fail because while it may 
force the transfer of technology patents, these patents 
will not be accompanied by the critical operational 
understanding necessary to manufacture and operate 
the technologies in question or to integrate them into 
existing complex socio-technical systems.
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(iii) embrace the results of an already naturally 
occurring global division of labour in energy 
innovation.
While new energy system technologies have historically 
flowed from West to East and North to South, today’s 
energy technology innovation ecosystem is much 
richer and more multi-directional. That is in part 
because most energy system growth is outside the 
West and much innovation is likely to occur where 
new systems are actually being built. It is also because 
global knowledge production is itself becoming more 
widely distributed.
Strong energy demand growth in China has led to rapid 
and large-scale construction of modern grids, renewable 
energy systems, and advanced nuclear power. It has also 
seen experimentation with energy efficiency, synthetic 
fuels, and Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) 
and Carbon Capture for Use (CCU). Ambitious global 
energy companies have begun to buy up innovative 
technologies and practices and induce new ones, and 
China’s scientific research establishment is growing – 
and increasing its ties to the West. As a result, China 
remains a useful global test-bed and incubator for new 
technology, some of it Western in origin but improved 
in use due to China’s need, speed, cost advantage, and 
liquidity. Elsewhere in Asia, South Korea has emerged 
as a nuclear power innovator to supply its own growing 
demand, and is building nuclear units abroad at 
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reportedly competitive rates. Japan is aiming to export 
advanced nuclear technology and expertise to the Gulf 
States, to south-east Asia and to some western countries, 
including Poland and Turkey.
But innovation learned through the experience of 
building and using a new system – rather in the way 
that the 19th century railway innovators did – is not 
the whole story. The United States remains a global 
hub for upstream scientific innovation and in some 
cases limited early commercial deployment (some of 
it financed by China) of advanced nuclear energy, CCS 
and CCU, energy storage, low carbon liquid fuels, and 
advanced renewables. The USA is also still a major global 
knowledge centre for materials science, the simulation 
and control specialties, and the design and engineering 
expertise that supports broad energy innovation.
Of course, China and the US are not the only potential 
global innovation sources. Despite stagnant energy 
demand, environmental and social policies have led 
Japan and parts of Europe to attempt to integrate into 
their grids large – perhaps unachievable – amounts of 
variable renewable resources such as wind and solar 
power. That effort, whatever its challenges and results, is 
likely to yield substantial innovations in grid operation 
and load-balancing technology along the way. Parts of 
the Arab Middle East appear poised to pour billions of 
dollars into advanced nuclear power and solar, as well 
as carbon use for enhanced oil recovery. Israeli start-ups 
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are making substantial advances in vehicle electrification 
and solar water heating.
What is now needed is a more considered international 
division of labour for energy innovation, forged from 
precisely these sorts of separate but complementary 
initiatives. Different technologies will require different 
treatment, and different countries will contribute 
according to their capacities. For target technologies 
still in basic research stages, highly-funded international 
research consortia similar to the mega-cyclotron 
initiatives of CERN may be suitable. Such initiatives 
share large burdens internationally and integrate a wide 
base of human and financial resources. That reduces risk 
and redundancy and enhances cooperation. Candidate 
technologies for this sort of early-stage effort include 
“blue sky” technologies such as nuclear fusion, space 
photo-voltaic, and microwave electric transfer.
For target technologies that are in more advanced 
development, and for which the principal challenges 
are more applied, regional, national and private sector 
development initiatives should be conducted. In parallel, 
global fora for information sharing and progress reports 
– such as the APEC initiatives highlighted previously – 
should promote both competition and collaboration 
among projects, thereby accelerating the development 
process.
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Sectoral approaches should also be advanced, in 
particular for the most energy intensive industry 
sectors such as power, steel and cement. Because 
energy experts in these industry sectors have common 
technological backgrounds, it is possible to pursue 
mutual benchmarking and technology transfer solutions. 
Sectoral base approaches can promote the rapid global 
diffusion of the best available technologies and the 
development of new, sector-appropriate low-carbon 
technology. The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Energy and Climate (APP), discussed previously, hosted 
such sectoral taskforces, and produced meaningful 
achievements. Members from the power and steel sectors 
conducted intensive peer review and energy diagnosis 
exercises, using common calculation methodologies for 
carbon intensity and energy efficiency developed under 
the APP Steel Task Force. Best practice and technology 
handbooks were also developed to be shared by members. 
The value of this approach is that these handbooks 
were developed by the industry experts who actually 
use and operate the relevant technologies, thereby 
assuring practicality and effectiveness. The calculation 
methodologies developed under APP have since been 
standardized through the International Organisation 
for Standards as ISOs, which will allow them to diffuse 
further beyond APP member countries.54
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ConCLusIon
(i) The future of ambition
“Ambition” is one of those words that politicians most love. 
They appropriate it to their causes because it resonates 
with optimism and it touches with a friendly glow every 
subject to which it is applied. It inspires confidence. In 
adversarial political combat, it also has the useful quality 
of wrong-footing opponents because to claim ambition for 
one’s own position is, by implication, to tar one’s opponent 
with its doleful opposite.
Talk of “ambition” has been at the centre of climate 
policy debates of recent years, where it has become the 
measuring stick by which each country’s commitment 
to climate change action – and, by implication, its 
moral virtue – is assessed. But we would argue that this 
dominant usage of “ambition” has been anything but 
ambitious. It has been a case of wishful thinking. As has 
been noted in this paper, it has appealed to a triumph 
of the will that confuses hope with fact, declaratory 
statements with action, and acts of legislation with 
real-world results.
We believe that such rhetoric has not been helpful. It also 
reveals a radical misunderstanding of what productive 
ambition can be.
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Productive ambition implies, as the Latin root suggests 
(from ambire, to walk about, to visit and seek the political 
support of), the careful investigation of possibilities and, 
crucially, the acquisition of public consent in order to 
produce meaningful, tangible results. Bearing this in 
mind, a relentless pragmatism may be the most ambitious 
approach, precisely because it is indirect and governed by 
the need for public agreement. These are key Hartwellian 
principles. In the terms of “Capability” Brown’s philosophy, 
by opening our eyes and our minds to the wide range of 
opportunities that line the oblique pathways that are less 
travelled – ambire – we improve our chances of lightening 
the human footprint on the planet while creating a more 
prosperous world. In the 2010 Hartwell Paper, we pointed 
to options that have since gained traction. This paper has 
been filled with examples of that. In this 2013 sequel, we 
have again sought to offer a guide to good practice, this 
time not in the realm of politics but in that of invention 
and innovation.
(ii) Ambition for the future
This paper has, we trust, been ambitious in the productive 
and radical sense, as it has reviewed and sought to 
identify errors in popular and political assumptions 
about innovation, and it has argued in favour of certain 
suggested corrective actions on various institutional 
levels. The eleven Building Blocks upon which the 
Hartwellian approach to energy innovation is set out 
have been explored. With these as our foundation, our 
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conclusion is that many of the recent policy-driven efforts 
to accelerate the deployment of new energy technologies 
have been unsuccessful because the conceptual framing 
of the enterprises was too narrow. This framing mistook 
that which is necessary (engineering innovation and 
invention) for that which is sufficient (a full engagement 
with the multiplicity of differing contexts in which 
and the variety of peoples and purposes for whom 
energy is to be provided). Material social change that 
is capable of enduring is first and foremost about 
human choice. Therefore, we explained, a much wider 
and more systematic assessment process is required 
to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of those affected by 
any such technological changes, as without this public 
credibility there is no hope that the developments could 
be successful and sustainable in the long-term.
If we wish the world’s populations to spontaneously 
and permanently prefer low-carbon technologies, 
it is essential that these sources are as economically 
productive as the higher-carbon alternatives – or at 
least very nearly so. (After all, there is evidence of some 
willingness to pay for environmental improvements – just 
not a vast and/or involuntary amount). Policies must 
therefore ensure that while inventors and innovators 
have maximum freedom to experiment, there is never any 
doubt that the aim of their work is to deliver improved 
cost efficiency. Only general prosperity can produce 
widespread consent for emissions reductions, and only 
affordable energy for all can deliver prosperity.
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Humanity was able to see earthrise for the first time in 
December 1968, through the cameras of the Apollo 8 
astronauts: our Earth shimmering against the blackness 
of space, the only point of colour that the astronauts could 
see, anywhere. The eleven Building Block concepts that we 
have described, which can support the energy transitions 
that humanity now needs, draw upon that sense of 
commonwealth which comes from understanding the 
indivisibility of our collective fate which was so effectively 
and elegantly expressed in those famous photographs. 
The tasks that are involved in achieving this technological 
breakthrough in a world of “wicked” problems greatly 
exceed in complexity the challenge of putting men in 
space. But the simple insight that the Apollo 8 astronauts 
brought back to Earth can help us to understand both 
why and how we may progress.
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Hartwell House in Buckinghamshire, where the Royal Meteorological 
Society was founded in 1850 and where the Hartwell group was originally 
formed and has continued to meet since 2009.
The                            programme
SiNCE THE 1980’S SCHOlarS aND PraCTiTiONErS OF THE 
HarTWEll GrOUP have been researching pragmatic actions that 
might lighten the human footprint on the planet, and presenting 
them in policy-ready form. THE ViTal SPark is the third paper by 
the Hartwell group. It offers a comprehensive prospectus for how 
to – and how not to – undertake the vital task of energy innovation 
and how to drive that agenda in domestic democratic politics, 
in innovation and invention, in business and in international 
diplomacy in coming years.
Clear-eyed, non-dogmatic and globally aware, THE ViTal SPark 
argues that only a high-energy planet is morally defensible or 
politically viable. But at present, only carbon-intensive sources of 
energy offer a realistic prospect of this, with obvious hazards to 
the climate. and current ‘green’ or ‘renewable’ alternatives are still 
far away from viability, despite massive governmental subsidies. 
The deployment models of the last decade have been badly flawed.
So can we hope for a high-energy, affordable energy, clean energy 
transition in the 21st century? if this question interests you, then 
THE ViTal SPark is essential reading.
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